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Interpreting by the Rules 
Rebecca M. Kysar* 
A promising new school of statutory interpretation has emerged that tries 
to wed the work of Congress with that of the courts by tying interpretation to 
congressional process. The primary challenge to this process-based interpretive 
approach is the difficulty in reconstructing the legislative process. Scholars have 
proposed leveraging Congress’s procedural frameworks and rules as reliable 
heuristics to that end. This Article starts from that premise but will add wrinkles 
to it. The complications stem from the fact that each rule is adopted for distinct 
reasons and is applied differently across contexts. As investigation into these 
particularities proceeds, it becomes apparent that the complications are also 
rooted in something deeper—that Congress’s procedures are often hollow, even 
fraudulent. Congress, it turns out, breaks its own rules with impunity.  
Which brings us to a deeper riddle: What is the significance of the rules to 
an interpreter when Congress routinely flouts them? If one’s goal is to accurately 
depict the lawmaking process in hopes of deriving rules of construction that have 
democratic roots, then surely the interpreter must discard the rules as hopelessly 
unreliable guideposts. Then again, if the interpreter’s ultimate aim is to serve 
democratic ends, then shouldn’t we strive toward rule of law values, ensuring 
that Congress acts in an honorable way? Ultimately, I resolve the question by 
first asking what the rules are meant to do. Only then can we understand what it 
means to interpret by them. Through examination of many procedural contexts, 
I set forth an innocuous account of congressional defiance of the rules. Rather 
than a symptom of branch dysfunction, we should see the rules as guidelines that 
attempt to order congressional business but that ultimately must give way to 
politics. Nonetheless, some rules can help the interpreter paint a more faithful 
picture of congressional procedure in spite of their not being followed. More 
broadly, I conclude that interpretive presumptions deriving from the general 
efficacy of legislative rules, rather than their precise enforcement, are more 
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Introduction  
In a sense, we students and scholars of statutory interpretation are all 
formalists. We strive to arrive at some ordered set of principles from which 
we can derive meaning from a statute. To this end, a promising new school 
of statutory interpretation has emerged that tries to wed the work of Congress 
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with that of the courts.1 It does so by linking rules of interpretation to 
Congress. The payoff is twofold. If those who write the laws and those who 
interpret them get on the same page, we can finally achieve a coordinating 
system of efficient and objective rules. Better yet, the link to Congress 
ensures that this particular brand of formalism has democratic legitimacy.  
This new “process-based”2 school of interpretation has already 
influenced federal judges, who have begun to adapt their interpretive 
approaches to reflect new empirical work on the congressional process.3 This 
empirical work offers a response to textualists who have long argued that 
Congress is simply too irrational and too complex for judges to understand. 
Armed with research, it is, in fact, possible to understand how Congress 
works. All that is needed is careful study of it.  
The process-based scholars have, for instance, studied modern 
developments in congressional process. Legislative paths like the 
reconciliation process complicate the traditional story of how a bill becomes 
a law. The rushed manner in which Congress passes reconciliation bills, they 
argue, should lead us to posit that Congress is not drafting with precision in 
that context.4 A judge must take this into account in deciding how much 
 
1. E.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of Formalism: The 
CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They Are Already Trying to Do, 
84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177 (2017); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part 
I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman I]; Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe 
R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014) [hereinafter Bressman & 
Gluck II]; Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by 
the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012); Rebecca M. Kysar, Penalty Default Interpretive Canons, 76 
BROOK. L. REV. 953 (2011); Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and 
Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519 (2009) [hereinafter Kysar, Listening to 
Congress]. 
2. See Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193, 
2193 (2017) (using the term). Justice Barrett clarifies that the term “process-based approach” is 
distinct from the Legal Process method promulgated by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. Id. at 
2196 n.7. Whereas Legal Process invites judges to unearth the shared purposes of legislators in 
enacting the law in question, the process-based approach instead “attempt[s] to calibrate 
interpretation to the details of the legislative process.” Id.; see also HENRY M. HART JR. & ALBERT 
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 
1378 (Foundation 1994) (William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (instructing judges 
to imagine themselves “in the position of the legislature which enacted the measure”). 
3. Gluck, supra note 1, at 190–91, 196, 198 (citing opinions and writings from Chief Justice 
John Roberts, Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson, and 
Judge Robert Katzmann). 
4. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s 
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 79 (2015) (exploring the Court’s 
role in this regard). 
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interpretive slack to give to Congress when it enacts “unorthodox” 
legislation.5   
Surveys of staffers have turned up inconsistencies between old canons 
of construction and legislative reality. Because congressional committees are 
siloed, for instance, the consistent usage canon should have no bearing in 
interpreting omnibus legislation, the parts of which have originated in 
different committees.6 And because staffers do not use dictionaries when 
drafting statutes, an interpreter’s reliance upon them is misguided.7 
These scholars have also developed canons of construction that derive 
from Congress’s procedural frameworks, a strain of the literature that is the 
primary focus of this Article.8 In early work, I myself argued that courts have 
the unique ability to leverage congressional transparency by interpreting 
legislation in accordance with legislative rules that are aimed at unearthing 
hidden special interest deals.9 Later scholars have gone further to use 
legislative rules more generally in the interpretive process.10  
This rules-based strain holds particular promise to process-based 
interpretation. If the primary challenge to this interpretive approach is the 
difficulty in reconstructing congressional process, then discovering reliable 
heuristics to that end may broaden the new school’s reach. The prescription 
seems simple enough. If we look to ways in which Congress governs itself, 
paying particular attention to its enumerated rules, we can better understand 
the congressional process and hence its output.  
This Article starts from that premise but will add wrinkles to it—so 
many, in fact, that the interpreter may at times be left only with a sow’s ear. 
The complications stem from the fact that each rule is adopted for distinct 
reasons and is applied differently across contexts. It may, for example, be 
prudent to assume Congress’s transparency rules are working as intended; 
other rules may cause us more trouble.  
As our investigation into these particularities proceeds, we will begin to 
see that the complications are also rooted in something deeper—that 
 
5. Chief Justice Roberts embraced this approach in depicting the Affordable Care Act as born 
out of a process that  “does not reflect the type of care and deliberation one might expect” in drafting. 
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015). 
6. See Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 1, at 936 (reporting that “most major statutes” are 
“conglomerations of multiple committees’ separate work”). 
7. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 1, at 938 (finding that “[m]ore than 50%” of congressional 
staffers surveyed said that “dictionaries are never or rarely used” when drafting). 
8. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 1, at 73–74 (advancing a view that an interpreter can use 
Congress’s rules to identify central sources of legislative history and text); Bressman & Gluck II, 
supra note 1, at 763–65 (noting the primacy of the budget rules in lawmaking and exploring a 
Congressional Budget Office canon of construction that responds to this); Gluck, supra note 1, at 
182 (same). 
9. Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1, at 563. 
10. E.g., Gluck, supra note 1, at 181; Nourse, supra note 1, at 73–74. 
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Congress’s procedures are often hollow, even fraudulent. Congress, it turns 
out, breaks its own rules with impunity. 
Which brings us to a deeper riddle: What is the significance of the rules 
to an interpreter when Congress routinely flouts them? If one’s goal is to 
accurately depict the lawmaking process in hopes of deriving rules of 
construction that have democratic roots, then surely the interpreter must 
discard the rules as hopelessly unreliable guideposts.  
Then again, if the interpreter’s ultimate aim is to serve democratic ends, 
then shouldn’t we strive toward rule of law values, ensuring that Congress 
acts in an honorable way? If so, then ignoring Congress’s deliberate violation 
of its rules in the interpretive process creates a mechanism to punish Congress 
when it does so. The counterfactual assumption may serve to help repair the 
“broken branch.”  
This interpretive conundrum defies traditional separation of powers 
analysis by forcing us to confront many overlapping inquiries and feedback 
loops. Ultimately, I resolve the question by first asking what the rules are 
meant to do. Only then can we understand what it means to interpret by them. 
Through examination of many procedural contexts, I set forth an innocuous 
account of congressional defiance of the rules. Rather than a symptom of 
branch dysfunction, we should see the rules as guidelines that attempt to 
order congressional business but that ultimately must give way to politics. 
The rules, in other words, are made to be broken. 
The judiciary, of course, must generally defer to politics if separation of 
powers is to mean anything. The Rulemaking Clause in the Constitution 
contemplates this arrangement, which prohibits the judiciary from enforcing 
legislative rules against Congress.11 So fundamental is the legislative power 
over its rules that it could be argued the Clause is superfluous; that generally 
accepted separation of powers principles would force us to arrive at the same 
result.12 
Having discarded the normative argument that the judiciary should 
improve congressional process by taking seriously congressional rules, does 
that mean the interpreter should abandon them altogether? To this, we must 
return to the descriptive and ask if they ever bring us closer to understanding 
congressional reality. The answer depends on the legislative rule and context 
in question. At times the rules may bear fruit; other times they may not. Some 
 
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings . . . .”); see also Rebecca M. Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the 
Origination Clause, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659, 699–703 (2014) (exploring the foundations of the 
Rulemaking Clause). 
12. See John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, 
Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489, 528 (2001) 
(discussing the lack of such a clause in the Articles of Confederation and the legislative body’s 
creation of legislative rules nonetheless). 
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rules can help paint a more faithful picture of congressional procedure in spite 
of their not being followed. Ultimately, I conclude that interpretive 
presumptions deriving from the efficacy of legislative rules, rather than their 
precise enforcement, are more successful in mirroring congressional reality. 
A deep dive into the weeds of congressional procedure is necessary to 
begin to understand what the rules can tell us. In so doing, I aim to lay the 
groundwork for an interpretive endeavor that serves to refine the process-
based approach by crafting a more nuanced picture of congressional reality.  
Such an approach preserves the ability of judges to rely confidently on 
fundamental aspects of the legislative process that are unlikely to change. 
Two of the process-based school’s leading lights, Abbe Gluck and Lisa 
Bressman, have noted that “[a]ny empirically grounded theory of 
interpretation will face th[e] problem of keeping up with changing 
circumstances.”13 This danger is not as prevalent with essential features of 
the legislative process, such as the prioritization of committee reports and the 
fast and loose nature of the reconciliation process, since those attributes are 
unlikely to change. Congressional adherence to legislative rules, however, is 
constantly evolving due to their nature as endogenous devices. Although at 
any given time, the congressional process may appear to be heavily 
influenced by a rule, this will change under different circumstances. The 
interpreter must be attuned to this dynamic. 
Others have critiqued the new interpretive school by invoking 
traditional textualist arguments.14 This Article contributes to the literature by 
instead assessing process-based interpretation, which is predicated on 
judicial understanding of the legislative process, on its own terms. It is my 
view that the process-based school creates a mechanism that sheds light on 
legislative priorities. For the judiciary to ignore the realities of the 
increasingly complex legislative atmosphere risks burying those priorities. 
But through examination of the many twists and turns the legislative process 
can take, we can see just how complex it is. Interpretation based on strict 
adherence to rules or some other simplistic proxy may very well lead the 
interpreter astray. Instead, the judiciary should pursue a more contextualized 
approach to process-based interpretation that better reflects legislative 
realities. So into the weeds we must go. 
* * * 
Part I of this Article provides background on the new process-based 
school of interpretation, as well as critiques that have been lodged against it. 
Part II discusses features of the legislative process, particularly those relating 
to legislative rules, and the ways in which they depart from the assumptions 
 
13. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 783. 
14. Barrett, supra note 2, at 2193–94; John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1911, 1916 (2015). 
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underlying some of the new school’s recommendations. Part III argues that 
normative considerations mitigate against wholesale importation of 
Congress’s rules into the interpretive project. Part IV offers a view of what 
process-based interpretation should look like, in light of the above concerns 
and observations.  
I.   Background  
The rise of the process-based school of interpretation has been steep 
over the past decade, but it has roots in earlier scholarly work. This Part traces 
that trajectory before turning to modern critiques of the school. 
A.  The New Process-Based School of Interpretation 
A number of scholars have attempted to improve the interpretive 
endeavor by introducing insight into the legislative process. The early 
scholars focused largely on how lawmakers used legislative history. 
Chancellor Nicholas Zeppos recommended that judges engage in a fact-
finding model of statutory interpretation, examining for instance the degree 
of exposure that a piece of legislative history had among lawmakers.15 
Professors Daniel Rodriguez and Barry Weingast leveraged positive political 
theory to identify pivotal lawmakers and the legislative history generated by 
them as particularly important in the interpretive process.16  
In an early example of the empirical turn in the literature, Professors 
Victoria Nourse and Jane Schacter conducted a case study of legislative 
drafting in the Senate Judiciary Committee.17 Their findings illustrated that 
drafters do not systematically comport with judicial views of statutory 
interpretation.18 For instance, despite Scalia’s powerful critique of legislative 
history, the committee continued to write congressional understandings of 
the legislation.19 The Nourse/Schacter study also explored other issues, such 
as the lack of influence of canons upon the drafting process,20 the influential 
role of lobbyists in drafting the text of bills,21 and the heterogenous nature of 
drafting practices.22 
 
15. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1359–60 (1990). 
16. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative 
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1417, 1450 (2003). 
17. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 576 (2002). 
18. Id. at 578. 
19. Id. at 583. 
20. Id. at 600–02. 
21. Id. at 610–13. 
22. Id. at 583–93. 
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More recently, Victoria Nourse has argued that interpretation of statutes 
should hinge on congressional rules.23 Nourse reasons that legislative history 
can only be understood against the backdrop of legislative rules. In her view, 
the rules can be used to separate the “wheat from the chaff of legislative 
history.”24 For textualists, the rules can identify which texts are central in 
cases of conflict.25 
Nourse argues for a presumption that Congress not only knows but also 
follows its legislative rules.26 For example, Nourse argues that Public Citizen 
v. U.S. Department of Justice,27 a notoriously difficult statutory interpretation 
case, could have been easily resolved by following the legislative rule that 
conference committees do not have authority over matters where the House 
and Senate are in agreement.28 Similarly, Nourse contends that the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in TVA v. Hill29 overlooked congressional rules that forbid 
legislative text on appropriations.30  
Most notable among scholars representing the modern process-based 
school of interpretation, Professors Gluck and Bressman surveyed 137 
staffers involved in legislative drafting, posing 171 questions that seek to 
explore the interpretive responsibilities of courts and agencies and detailing 
their findings in two articles.31 In undertaking this ambitious project, Gluck 
and Bressman seek to corroborate or discredit the assumptions about drafting 
that undergird the theories and practice of statutory interpretation.32 For 
instance, they suggest certain items in the textualist’s arsenal are not 
supported by congressional reality.  
Most relevant for our purposes, in response to their survey, many staff 
highlighted the importance of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) score 
in drafting the statute.33 Specifically, staff revise legislation in response to 
CBO’s comments on draft bills so that budget targets are met. From this, 
 
23. Nourse, supra note 1, at 73. 
24. Id. at 75. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 91–92. 
27. 491 U.S. 440 (1989). 
28. Nourse, supra note 1, at 94 (“Conference committees cannot—repeat, cannot—change the 
text of a bill where both houses have agreed to the same language.” (emphasis in original)). 
29. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
30. Nourse, supra note 1, at 132. 
31. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 1, at 906. 
32. Id. at 907. 
33. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 763. 
KYSAR.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2021  12:31 PM 
2021] Interpreting by the Rules 1123 
Gluck and Bressman recommended a CBO canon,34 which Gluck developed 
in other work.35  
Finally, in a recent book, Judge Robert Katzmann forcefully argues that 
judges must understand the institutional dynamics of Congress in their 
interpretation of statutes. In Katzmann’s view, “understanding [the 
legislative] process is essential if it is to construe statutes in a manner faithful 
to legislative meaning.”36 Katzmann draws upon the work of Nourse and 
Schacter, as well as Gluck and Bressman, in painting a picture of the 
legislative process that may be surprising to most textualist judges. He 
emphasizes the heterogeneity of drafting practices, that legislation is drafted 
by staff, not members, and done so in alignment with the members’ policy 
preferences, and the heavy reliance by members on committee reports.37 He 
also notes the findings of others that canons are of little use to drafters, that 
they do not use dictionaries, nor do they seek coherence within or across 
statutes.38 Stemming out of these observations, Katzmann recommends that 
judges deemphasize some canons and use legislative history to the extent the 
legislators gave it priority.39 
B.  Critiques of the Process-Based School  
The rise of the process-based school has not gone unchallenged. Notable 
critiques have come from Professor John Manning and Justice Amy Barrett, 
both grounding their views in textualism. I discuss their views below.  
1. Intent Skepticism 
Professor Manning’s account of the process-based school is that it 
simply has nothing to offer to those interpretive theories that are skeptical of 
legislative intent. He posits that although Gluck and Bressman do not 
explicitly align themselves with intentionalism, they rely upon the subjective 
intent of the drafters in criticizing prior interpretive methods and justifying 
new ones.40 Yet in Manning’s view, the authors’ findings do not undermine 
 
34. Id. at 782. 
35. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 187–89 (arguing for judges to interpret ambiguous statutes in 
accordance with the CBO’s assumptions in calculating statutes’ budgetary impacts); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1851–52 (2015) (same); Abbe Gluck, The “CBO Canon” and the Debate 
Over Tax Credits on Federally Operated Health Insurance Exchanges, BALKINIZATION (July 10, 
2012, 8:55 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/cbo-canon-and-debate-over-tax-credits.html 
[https://perma.cc/T3RG-SLX8] (same). 
36. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 8–9 (2014). 
37. Id. at 11–22. 
38. Id. at 43, 49, 52–53. 
39. Id. at 52. 
40. Manning, supra note 14, at 1935. 
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the inherent indeterminacy of legislative intent nor do they obviate the need 
for a normative frame of reference in making sense of such intent.41 
To illustrate, Manning canvasses various approaches to statutory 
interpretation and how they manifest what he labels “intent skepticism.” 
Textualists, for instance, argue that social choice theory illustrates that 
lawmakers may “cycle endlessly” their intransitive preferences and that 
“intent” of the majority therefore depends on arbitrary factors such as the 
order upon which policies were voted.42 Another of their claims is that the 
legislative process is simply too complex for judges to replicate.43  
But the intent skepticism is not just confined to textualists, according to 
Manning. Legal realists assert that judges engage in policymaking when 
deciding cases and will not attempt to unearth the intentions of hundreds of 
legislators.44 Pragmatists also express doubt about discerning legislative 
intent, given the number of actors involved and the limitations of the 
historical record, instead prescribing pragmatic reasoning to decide statutory 
cases.45 Dworkinians would posit that vexing questions over whose intention 
should count and the need for aggregating intent make the whole endeavor 
arbitrary.46 Finally, according to Manning, even Legal Process scholars are 
intent skeptics who urge a pursuit of a reasonable purpose rather than actual 
legislative intent.47 In Manning’s view, these theories leave room for 
inserting normative views about the system of government into the 
interpreting process, having freed the interpreter from making a factual 
inquiry into congressional intent.48 
Having discussed the older theories of statutory interpretation, Manning 
then turns to the process-based scholars, who have in various ways proposed 
methods of discovering Congress’s actual decision-making through 
gathering evidence about how Congress works. Manning argues that these 
new scholars align themselves with classic intentionalists but that their 
findings do not obviate the arguments of the intent skeptics.49 No matter how 
well we know the minds of lawmakers, Manning contends, we still must 
make value judgments in making attributions to Congress.50 
Manning argues that even though staff may be unaware of common 
tools of statutory interpretation, this does not render them objectionable. Such 
 
41. Id. at 1936–37. 
42. Id. at 1918. 
43. Id. at 1918–19. 
44. Id. at 1919–20. 
45. Id. at 1920. 
46. Id. at 1921. 
47. Id. at 1922. 
48. Id. at 1924. 
49. Id. at 1935–37. 
50. Id. at 1937. 
KYSAR.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2021  12:31 PM 
2021] Interpreting by the Rules 1125 
“off-the-rack rules” may enable Congress to express itself, regardless of 
whether the drafters intentionally have followed them.51 As Gluck and 
Bressman point out, today’s Congress legislates through unorthodox 
lawmaking that involves multiple committees, thus rendering consistent-
usage canons like the whole act rule suspect.52 And today’s staffers do not 
consult dictionaries when they are drafting statutes.53 In Manning’s view, 
these findings only reinforce the notion that Congress does not resolve 
interpretive questions at a granular level. Instead, we must look to 
conceptions of legislative supremacy or faithful agency to fill in the gaps.54 
Gluck and Bressman also rely on their survey to question textualist 
objections to legislative history. In Manning’s view, this is also problematic 
because whether legislative history constitutes legislative intent is a 
normative question.55 Why, after all, should we defer to the technical product 
of unelected Legislative Counsel rather than the product upon which 
Congress itself chooses to vote?56 In other words, Gluck and Bressman’s 
empirical work “force[s] us to reckon with the fact that there is no way to 
derive legislative intent from the brute facts of the legislative process,”57 
thereby confirming intent skepticism rather than quelling it. 
2. Congressional “Insiders” Versus “Outsiders” 
Justice Barrett argues that the new process-based statutory interpretation 
scholars incorrectly assume that statutory interpretation theorists endeavor to 
reflect the actual practices of the drafters.58 Barrett contends instead that this 
misses the mission of textualism entirely. Whereas the process-based 
scholars are focused on “congressional insiders” or hypothetical legislators 
in their approach to language, textualists emphasize the importance of 
“congressional outsiders” or the ordinary readers of statutory text.59  
Barrett contends that this divide can be explained by different 
conceptions of faithful agency. Textualists, in her view, are agents of the 
people, whereas the process-based scholars are agents of Congress. 
Textualists are therefore bound to the most ordinary meaning of the statute 
since that is how their principal interprets them.60  
 
51. Id. at 1943. 
52. Gluck & Bressman I, supra note 1, at 936. 
53. Id. at 938. 
54. Manning, supra note 14, at 1942. 
55. Id. at 1945. 
56. Id. at 1946. 
57. Id. at 1952. 
58. Barrett, supra note 2, at 2193–94. 
59. Id. at 2194. 
60. Id. at 2195. 
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Barrett emphasizes that the process-based theorists themselves rely on 
statutory text above all else and thus are influenced by textualists. And, unlike 
Manning, she takes Gluck and Bressman at their word—that they are also 
intent skeptics.61 It is at this point, however, that the textualists and process-
based theorists diverge. If both discard actual legislative intent, the textualist 
constructs objective intent based on an ordinary reader. A process-based 
theorist bases objective intent on the experience of a hypothetical 
lawmaker.62  
Using this view of faithful agency, Barrett contends that the textualists’ 
predilection for dictionaries and canons is not undermined by evidence that 
Congress rejects them but would only be thwarted by evidence that the 
canons do not track common usage.63 Barrett extends this reasoning to 
legislative history. Professor Nourse proposes that courts should interpret in 
accordance with legislative rules because this is how a typical lawmaker 
would have understood the language.64 A textualist, according to Barrett, 
would reject this endeavor as failing to reflect how an ordinary person would 
read the statute—congressional practice be damned.65  
3. The Conversation Model of Interpretation 
In a vein similar to Professor Barrett’s, Professor Doerfler argues that 
insights from the philosophy of language necessitate viewing the law as a 
conversation between lawmakers and administers of the law (courts and 
agencies) or lawmakers and objects of the law (citizens).66 In contrast, a 
process-based model of interpretation erroneously treats the law as being 
written for lawmakers by other lawmakers. This is because it focuses on the 
legislative process, of which lawmakers are acutely aware but citizens are 
deeply ignorant.67 In Doerfler’s view, it is wholly irrelevant that committee 
reports are more salient to staffers than floor statements since ordinary 
citizens do not understand the distinction between the two.68 
4. Situating the Project 
On the following pages, I will complicate understandings of the 
legislative process upon which some of the process-based scholars’ 
 
61. Id. at 2200. 
62. Id. at 2200–01. 
63. Id. at 2204. 
64. Nourse, supra note 1, at 73–75. 
65. Barrett, supra note 2, at 2207. 
66. Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979 (2017). 
67. Id. at 1031, 1034. 
68. Id. at 1034. 
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recommendations are based. In doing so, I do not seek to undermine their 
endeavor but rather to elevate it through refinement, on its own terms of 
congressional understanding. Some of my conclusions may be taken to 
further the view of the textualists and others that the legislative process is 
simply too messy for judicial understanding.69 That is not my intention. I 
have greater faith in a judge’s ability to accompany me in the weeds, as I will 
later discuss. 
II.   Congressional Rules and Reality 
A.  Legislative Rules 
1. Background 
Before exploring the ways in which Congress deviates from its rules, it 
is helpful to understand their constitutional status and Congress’s general 
mode of enforcement. Each house enacts its own set of legislative rules, 
primarily through its standing rules. The House adopts its standing rules at 
the beginning of each Congress, largely adhering to the prior rules with some 
amendments.70 The standing rules of the Senate are in force until they are 
revised because the Senate has traditionally been viewed as a “continuing 
body,” meaning it continues to exist after an election cycle because only one 
third of its members face reelection each cycle (in contrast to the House, 
where all of its members are up for reelection every two years).71 
Some legislative rules are adopted outside the standing rules. For 
instance, rules governing the budget process are sometimes set forth in the 
budget resolution.72 Others are even codified in statutes.73 Despite the fact 
that they are not formally incorporated into the standing rules, these rules are 
not different in kind. 
In addition to the rules, each house also collects a rich body of 
precedential rulings, which have varying, and sometimes mysterious, degrees 
 
69. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 548 (1983) 
(describing the complexities of the legislative process and the challenges it poses for statutory 
interpretation). 
70. Stanley Bach, Legislating: Floor and Conference Procedures in Congress, in 2 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM 701–02 (Joel H. Silbey ed., 1994). 
71. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA 
L. REV. 1401, 1404 (2010) (criticizing the traditional view). 
72. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 3, 115th Cong. §§ 4002–03 (2017) (setting forth modifications to 
existing budget rules). 
73. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment, Separation 
of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 346 (2003). 
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of authority.74 In the Senate, for instance, the most forceful precedents are 
those that the entire Senate body has weighed in on.75 Some precedents may 
even take priority over the standing rules.76 
The Constitution generally imposes few restraints upon the legislative 
process. Article I, Section Five, Clause Two authorizes each house to 
“determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”77 In addition to creating its rules, 
as a constitutional matter, each house may change them without action by the 
other house.78 This is almost certainly the case even when Congress enacts 
internal rules through statutes. Although statutes require passage by the other 
house, as well as the President’s signature to become law, the Rulemaking 
Clause likely requires that they be voidable by one chamber.79  
Importantly for our purposes, the hallmark of legislative rules is 
flexibility. Each house can make, amend, repeal, suspend, ignore, or waive 
their legislative rules.80 Each can also choose from several different 
procedural frameworks in passing laws.81  
This flexibility also extends towards the rules’ enforcement, which is 
wholly internal to Congress. A member of Congress can only enforce a rule 
violation by making a point of order.82 In the House, the Speaker and the 
Chairman of the Committee rule on all points of order, which can be 
overruled by the body on appeal, usually by a two-thirds vote.83 Senators who 
have submitted points of order may demand a Senate vote.84 Rules can be 
 
74. I DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS, at vii (1994) (analogizing legislative rule precedents to the 
common law in terms of precedential value). 
75. See Stanley Bach, The Nature of Congressional Rules, 5 J.L. & POL. 725, 734 (explaining 
that the “most compelling Senate precedents” are those created by the entire Senate “vot[ing] on a 
question of procedure”). 
76. See id. at 733 (describing precedents in both houses that “effectively supplant” standing 
rules). 
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. 
78. Bach, supra note 70, at 702. 
79. Bruhl, supra note 73, at 386–90. A more controversial reading of the Clause is that it bars 
rulemaking through statutes. Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional 
Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 430 (2004) (contending that the unconstitutionality of statutory 
internal rules is likely not “good constitutional design”). 
80. Roberts, supra note 12, at 525; see also Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1007, 1021–25 (2011) [hereinafter Kysar, Lasting Legislation] (discussing the endogeneity 
of legislative rules in the budgetary context). 
81. The Senate, for instance, can expedite consideration of a bill by invoking cloture. STANDING 
RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, r. XXII, at 15 (2007). The House generally has five 
procedural frameworks in which it can legislate. Michael B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of 
Legislative Rules and the “Political” Political Question Doctrine, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1341, 1345 
(1990). 
82. CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, 
RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 24 (1989) (noting that questions of congressional procedure 
are decided by points of order, which may be appealed to the full chamber). 
83. Bach, supra note 75, at 734, 745. 
84. Id. at 740–41. 
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waived or suspended in the Senate, however, by unanimous consent 
agreements.85 
Congressional power over the internal rules stems from not only the 
Rulemaking Clause but Congress’s inherent lawmaking authority as well. 
Justice Story described this inherent authority as follows: 
No person can doubt the propriety of the provision authorizing each 
house to determine the rules of its own proceedings. If the power did 
not exist, it would be utterly impracticable to transact the business of 
the nation, either at all, or at least with decency, deliberation, and 
order. The humblest assembly of men is understood to possess this 
power; and it would be absurd to deprive the councils of the nation of 
a like authority.86  
The legislature’s control over its internal processes can be traced to the 
British theory of legislative sovereignty, which was erected to counter the 
monarchy.87 Perhaps because of its strong historical roots, the Framers 
adopted the Rulemaking Clause without any deliberation.88  
Separation of powers principles thus suggest the Clause may, in fact, be 
superfluous. This conclusion receives support from the fact that the 
Constitution’s predecessor, the Articles of Confederation, had no such clause 
and yet the Continental Congress had purview over its legislative rules.89 To 
be sure, the Constitution does place some limitations on the lawmaking 
process, which the judiciary can enforce. For instance, Article I prescribes 
rules for legislative assembly, selection of officers, discipline of members, 
and voting and quorum rules, among others. Article I, Section Seven also 
prescribes the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, 
procedure” for enacting or repealing law.90 
Even still, Article I, Section Seven leaves most of the process details to 
Congress, apart from bicameralism and presentment.91 For instance, the 
Constitution is silent as to whether an identical bill must be passed by each 
 
85. JUDY SCHNEIDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30945, HOUSE AND SENATE RULES OF 
PROCEDURE: A COMPARISON 4 (2008). 
86. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 298 
(reprinted 1987) (1833); see also Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1, at 568–69 (noting that 
it may be “inherent within legislative powers” to have “control over legislative rules”). 
87. Stephen Raher, Judicial Review of Legislative Procedure: Determining Who Determines the 
Rules of Proceedings 36 (Aug. 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Midwest Political 
Science Association Spring Conference, 2009), http://works.bepress.com/stephen_raher/1/ 
download [https://perma.cc/44H5-WWCE]. 
88. See Bruhl, supra note 73, at 385 (noting that after an amendment by James Madison, the 
section was approved “without further debate or controversy”). 
89. See Roberts, supra note 12, at 528 (observing that the Continental Congress adopted 
legislative rules “as a matter of course” despite the lack of authorization in the Articles of 
Confederation). 
90. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
91. Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1, at 530 n.52. 
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house, instead leaving Congress to designate how to agree on a bill that is 
presented to the President.92 The Constitution is also silent on the manner of 
passage. Under current legislative rules, a bill can pass with only one member 
of the majority present, and there is no requirement that a legislator know the 
contents of the bill before a vote.93 
2. Examples of Rules and Deviations 
The above framework illustrates that legislative rules are endogenous to 
Congress and Congress may do with them what they wish. They can be 
ignored, waived, amended, etc. The rest of this section will explore a few 
examples of legislative rules, how they have been used in the case law, and 
how Congress actually interprets, enforces, and deviates from them. 
a. The Prohibition Against Lawmaking Through Appropriations.—Two 
types of legislation are: authorizing legislation, which creates or modifies a 
government activity or program; and appropriations, which provides funding 
for the activity or program.94 Longstanding congressional rules and practice 
erected this distinction.95 In the 1800s, appropriations began to be delayed 
because of debates over substantive legislation. In 1837, the House addressed 
this problem by adopting a rule that prohibited appropriations from being 
reported on authorizing legislation if not previously authorized.96 Other 
legislative rules maintain the separation between the categories, although, as 
will be discussed, the distinction is increasingly blurred. Current House Rule 
XXI(2) and Senate Rule XVI(4) prohibit appropriations from changing 
 
92. Roberts, supra note 12, at 523–24. 
93. Id. at 524. Although the Supreme Court has ruled there are certain contexts in which 
Congress must make findings when it passes a law, there is no general rationality requirement. Id.; 
see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (invalidating an 
antidiscrimination law on the grounds of lack of congressional findings); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (striking down a provision allowing victims of gender-motivated violence 
to sue in federal court in spite of congressional findings regarding the impact of such victims and 
their families); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (striking down congressional 
regulations of guns because of Congress’s failure to make sufficient findings). For critiques of this 
case law, see Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and 
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1708 (2002) and Ruth 
Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001). 
94. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44736, THE HOLMAN RULE (HOUSE RULE XXI, CLAUSE 2(B)) 
1 (2019). 
95. Id. 
96. ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
UNITED STATES , v. IV, ch. XCV, § 3578, at 382–83 (1907). 
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existing law.97 The principle embodied by these rules is sometimes invoked 
by courts in the course of interpreting statues. 
In an 1886 case, U.S. v. Langston,98 for instance, the Supreme Court 
deployed the rule against changes to substantive law via the appropriations 
process in construing whether a statute prescribing the salary of a public 
officer could be modified or repealed by subsequent appropriations of a lesser 
amount.99 Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly rely on an 
underlying legislative rule prohibiting substantive changes via 
appropriations, it may have been inspired by congressional practice.  
The Court was explicit in its reliance on the rules in a well-known 1978 
statutory interpretation case, TVA v. Hill, when it considered whether 
subsequent appropriations measures that funded the construction of a dam 
violated the Endangered Species Act.100 The Court held that the 
appropriations could not be used for an otherwise unlawful purpose, in part 
reasoning that congressional rules supported this result.101 The Court 
specifically cited to House Rule XXI(2) and Senate Rule XVI(4) and noted 
that an opposite ruling would “assume that Congress meant to repeal [a part 
of the Endangered Species Act] by means of a procedure expressly prohibited 
under the rules of Congress.”102 Other lower courts have adopted an 
interpretive rule against changes to substantive law via the appropriations 
process without explicitly relying upon the relevant legislative rules.103  
 
97. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 115-177, r. XXI(2)(a)(1), at 871 (2019) (“An appropriation may 
not be reported in a general appropriation bill, and may not be in order as an amendment thereto, 
for an expenditure not previously authorized by law. . . .”); id. at r. XXI(2)(c), at 872 (“An 
amendment to a general appropriation bill shall not be in order if changing existing law . . . .”); 
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-1, r. XVI(2), at 11 (2014) (“The Committee on 
Appropriations shall not report an appropriation bill containing amendments to such bill proposing 
new or general legislation . . . .”); id. at r. XVI(4), at 15 (“On a point of order made by any Senator, 
no amendment . . . which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropriation 
bill . . . and any such amendment or restriction to a general appropriation bill may be laid on the 
table without prejudice to the bill.”); id. at r. XVI(6), at 15 (“When a point of order is made against 
any restriction on the expenditure of funds appropriated in a general appropriation bill on the ground 
that the restriction violates this rule, the rule shall be construed strictly and, in case of doubt, in 
favor of the point of order.”). 
98. 118 U.S. 389 (1886). 
99. Id. at 394. 
100. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 156 (1978). 
101. Id. at 191. 
102. Id. 
103. See, e.g., Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (acknowledging 
the “established rule” that courts must “construe[] narrowly” appropriations measures that 
“arguably conflict with the underlying authorizing legislation”); Donovan v. Carolina Stalite Co., 
734 F.2d 1547, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (same); EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 1224, 1234 
(S.D. Miss. 1983) (holding an appropriations provision allowing the EEOC to enforce the Equal 
Pay Act unconstitutional because Congress had “done nothing to directly enact” substantive 
legislation on the issue). 
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Both the Supreme Court and lower courts, however, have decided not to 
follow this rule when the amendment or repeal of the substantive law is 
clear.104 One of these cases is worth discussing in detail. In Roe v. Casey,105 
the Third Circuit held that the Hyde Amendment in an appropriations bill 
modified a Medicaid statute requiring participating states to fund abortions 
that receive federal reimbursement.106 The court noted that the House of 
Representatives waived all points of order raised against the Hyde 
Amendment for failure to comply with House Rule XXI(2).107 The court 
rejected the lower court’s invocation of TVA v. Hill, stating that “it is not our 
duty to prescribe optimal methods of legislation” but “[r]ather it is simply 
our duty to interpret statutes in accordance with the intent of the 
legislature.”108 
Roe v. Casey is significant because the court recognized that each house 
enforces its rules. The court was thus right to look at the legislative record to 
see if, in fact, the houses waived the rule against legislating through 
appropriations. Should courts, however, necessarily assume that Congress 
has followed its rules if no waiver appears? Not necessarily.  
Appropriations bills often contain authorizations through a number of 
different paths, in addition to formal waiver by the body.109 Congress, for 
instance, can simply choose to not enforce its rules. A member must 
affirmatively raise a point of order in order to strike an authorization from 
the appropriations bill because legislative rules are not self-enforcing. If the 
 
104. See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 555 (1940) (noting that when Congress 
desires to suspend or repeal a statute, “[t]here can be no doubt that . . . it could accomplish its 
purpose by an amendment to an appropriation bill, or otherwise”); Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 836 
(3rd Cir. 1980) (holding that states are not required to provide abortions that the federal government 
will not fund because “the legislative history makes it evident that the Congress intended the Hyde 
Amendment to have substantive impact”); Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1, 9 (10th 
Cir. 1973) (“Appropriation acts are just as effective a way to legislate as are ordinary bills relating 
to a particular subject. An appropriation act may be used to suspend or to modify prior Acts of 
Congress.”); see also Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) (“Congress . . . 
may amend substantive law in an appropriations statute, as long as it does so clearly.”); United 
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980) (noting that although legislative rules prohibit changing 
substantive law through appropriations manners, Congress nonetheless has the ability to do so); City 
of Chicago v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 423 F.3d 777, 782 
(7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e cannot ignore clear expressions of Congressional intent, regardless of 
whether the end product is an appropriations rider or a statute that has proceeded through the more 
typical avenues of deliberation.”); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 133–34 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(acknowledging Congress’s clear intent and prerogative to legislate by an appropriations bill). 
105. 623 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1980). 
106. Id. at 831. 
107. Id. at 836. 
108. Id. 
109. See, e.g., Sandra Beth Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Altar of 
Appropriations Riders: A Constitutional Crisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457, 506 (1997) 
(explaining that the House Committee on Rules “often does waive or suspend rules” when 
addressing appropriations bills). 
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members do not do so, perhaps because they support the bill’s substance or 
sense enough support to override a point of order, then the offending 
language remains.110 Members may also fail to object to relatively minor 
provisions.111 
In addition to the typical procedures available to waive legislative rules 
discussed above,112 the House frequently creates a “special rule” for 
appropriations bills, which effectively allows such bills to avoid points of 
order under House Rule XXI.113 Congress also often enacts continuing 
resolutions, rather than appropriations bills, which temporarily fund the 
government. Because these resolutions are not considered general  
appropriations bills, they are not subject to the rules forbidding authorization 
on appropriations.114 In fact, this may partially account for the increasing use 
of continuing resolutions as the means to fund the government.115 
Congress sometimes slips authorizations into omnibus appropriations. 
Traditionally, the appropriation bills were passed in thirteen separate 
measures. Omnibus bills bundle two or more of these bills. Like continuing 
resolutions, they fund a vast array of government programs and activities, but 
they are subject to House Rule XXI and Senate Rule XVI since they are 
considered general appropriations bills.116 That being said, Congress often 
legislates in such bills, avoiding points of order since these are typically 
“must pass” measures politically speaking.117  
These numerous paths by which each house may circumvent the 
prohibition on legislating in appropriations bills call into question whether 
courts should rely on these rules in the interpretive process. One option would 
be for a court, like the one in Roe v. Casey, to search the legislative record to 
see if Congress has waived the rules. But even this would not be sufficient. 
Since the rules are not self-enforcing, they are inherently politicized. Not 
following them may simply reflect support for the underlying legislation.  
Returning to arguments in favor of using the rules in interpretation, 
Professor Nourse contends that courts who fail to see the influence of the 
rules upon the bill’s text and structure are likely to misunderstand the 
 
110. Mark Champoux & Dan Sullivan, Authorizations and Appropriations: A Distinction 




112. See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
113. WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN & CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOUSE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE 
RULES, PRECEDENTS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 857, 868 (2003). 
114. Champoux & Sullivan, supra note 110, at 17–18. 
115. Id. at 18. 
116. See id. at 18–19 (explaining that omnibus acts differ from continuing resolutions “because 
they are considered general appropriations bills”). 
117. Id. at 19. 
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legislation.118 She specifically references TVA v. Hill for support of her 
view.119 As discussed above, the TVA v. Hill Court relied on legislative rules 
to argue that the appropriations could not have been for a project that violated 
the Act since Congress lacked the power to amend law via appropriations.120 
Despite this notable occurrence of judicial invocation of legislative rules, 
which would seem to support Nourse’s agenda, she takes a different approach 
than the Court.  
Under Nourse’s view, the relevant rules prevent an authorizing 
committee from amending the bill with language contrary to the 
appropriations, which means that “appropriations trump authorizations.”121 
Nourse contends that Congress could not have amended the appropriations 
bill to make clear its intent to override the Act since doing so would have 
violated the rules. Thus, the Court’s application of the judicial canon against 
“repeal by implication” was inappropriate.122 In her view, there was a repeal 
by implication precisely because Congress could not have explicitly repealed 
the relevant language in the Endangered Species Act even if it wanted to.123  
This understanding, however, overlooks the various methods in which 
Congress can circumvent its own rules.  
The contradictory positions of the Court and Nourse also nicely 
illustrate another problem with relying on the rules in the interpretive 
endeavor. Even if we can prove Congress followed a rule precisely, it is 
difficult to ascribe a single meaning to that. The TVA v. Hill Court assumed 
Congress followed the rule against legislating in appropriations bills and 
came to the conclusion that Congress did not repeal the relevant part of the 
Endangered Species Act through the appropriation for the dam.124 Nourse 
assumed the same yet concluded that Congress did effectuate the repeal. The 
quandary created by the rules gets the interpreter nowhere in this instance. It 
is equally plausible that Congress followed the rules by avoiding a repeal 
altogether and that it followed the rules by enacting a repeal by implication. 
It is also equally plausible that Congress meant to not follow the rules at all.  
b. The Prohibition Against Inserting New Matter at Conference.—Turning 
to another legislative rule, before a bill becomes law, the House and Senate 
 
118. Nourse, supra note 1, at 128–29. 
119. Id. at 130. 
120. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text. 
121. Nourse, supra note 1, at 131. 
122. Id. at 133. 
123. Id. 
124. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978). 
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must pass the exact same measure with identical text.125 Legislative 
differences between the two houses must thus be sorted out. One means to 
do so is the conference committee whereby several representatives from each 
house attempt to iron out the differences between the two positions in a 
conference bill.126 Typically, this method is used for major bills.127 
In theory, the rules of each house significantly restrict the scope of the 
conference. In practice, conferees have developed tactics to avoid such 
strictures. Senate Rule XXVIII(3) prevents conferees from “insert[ing] in 
their report matter not committed to them by either House” and from 
“strik[ing] from the bill matter agreed to by both Houses.”128 In other words, 
the conference bill must only resolve differences between the House and 
Senate bills and cannot remove language that is the same in both bills. Doing 
so subjects the report to a point of order, which can be waived by three-fifths 
of the Senate.129 House Rule XXII(9) has similar requirements for conference 
bills. Under this rule, conferees may only consider a “germane modification 
of the matter in disagreement,” which does not include “language presenting 
specific additional matter not committed to the conference committee by 
either House.”130 As in the Senate, nongermane matters are enforced by 
points of order.131 
This limitation on conferees is not as simple to interpret as it may seem. 
The conferees are limited to addressing the scope of differences between the 
House and Senate bills on a particular matter. The scope of differences 
includes the House position, the Senate position, and somewhere in between 
the two positions.132 The range of permissible options may be easy to 
ascertain when the differences are quantitative.133 For instance, if the House 
proposed a corporate tax rate of 20% and the Senate proposed 28%, then the 
permissible scope would be 20–28%. Anything higher or lower than that 
range would be nongermane. 
If, on the other hand, the differences are more qualitative, then the 
permissible range may be far less easy to entertain, thus making enforcement 
 
125. ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-696, RESOLVING LEGISLATIVE 
DIFFERENCES IN CONGRESS: CONFERENCE COMMITTEES AND AMENDMENTS BETWEEN THE 
HOUSES 1 (2019). 
126. Id. at 4. The other method is to reconcile the two versions through amendments between 
the houses. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XXVIII(3), at 40 (2013). 
129. Id. r. XXVIII(5)–(6), at 40–41. 
130. CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 115-177, r. XXII(9), at 944 (2019). 
131. Id. r. XXII(10), at 948. 
132. RYBICKI, supra note 125, at 15. 
133. Id. 
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of the rule difficult.134 An example may help illustrate the conundrum. Under 
current federal income tax law, there is a top 21% rate on corporations and a 
top 20% rate on most dividends received from corporations. This structure is 
referred to as the “corporate double tax.” Suppose, for instance, the House 
passed a bill that eliminated the double taxation on corporate income (a 
reform referred to by tax experts as “corporate tax integration”135) by 
excluding dividend income in the hands of shareholders but also raised the 
corporate rate to 23%. The Senate bill, on the other hand, keeps the corporate 
double tax rate structure as is, including the corporate rate of 21%.  
Would a conference agreement proposing an increase in the corporate 
rate from the current rate of 21% be considered nongermane? Perhaps, since 
the House bill’s plan to integrate the corporate tax could be seen as an overall 
reduction in the corporate double tax. On the other hand, just taking the 
corporate tax rate in isolation, the permissible range for conferees to consider 
could be 21–23%. The difference in kind between the two proposals 
complicates the germaneness inquiry. Accordingly, we can expect some 
slippage between the letter of the rules and how they are followed.  
A primary way in which the restrictions on conferees are circumvented 
is when the second chamber passes an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute. Such an amendment replaces the entire text of the bill passed by 
the first chamber.136 In such cases, the second chamber submits only one 
amendment to conference, even though the substitute bill could encompass 
many differences between the House and Senate versions. This makes it very 
difficult to identify the point of disagreement and the scope of the 
differences.137 In such cases, the entire text of the bill is in play and policy 
differences may be acute.138 This may mean that a conference substitute 
emerges that deviates from either approach. Although the rules intend to 
prevent this, assessing whether matter is “new” is often impractical.139  
In general, points of order are rarely made against conference reports.140 
In the House, a two-thirds vote can suspend the rules, thus barring points of 
order, or a simple majority in the House can approve a special rule waiving 
points of order against a conference report.141 If a member senses that waiver 
may be readily achieved, she may not bother making a point of order.  
 
134. Id. 
135. See, e.g., JANE C. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44638, CORPORATE TAX 
INTEGRATION AND TAX REFORM 1 (2016) (referring to corporate tax integration as the “elimination 
or reduction of additional taxes” arising from “corporate income[‘s being] taxed twice”). 
136. RYBICKI, supra note 125, at 15. 
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The threshold for waiver in the Senate is higher, requiring sixty votes, 
but the Senate has historically interpreted the conference rule generously. 
According to Riddick’s Senate Procedure, a conference report must simply 
avoid new “matter entirely irrelevant to the subject matter” in the prior 
bills.142 The latitude is even greater with conference substitutes, which face 
“little limitation on their discretion, except as to germaneness,”143 a 
requirement that has been interpreted in a “commonsense” manner.144 
With all of this in mind, let us explore the risks of relying upon the 
conference rule in the interpretive process, which the Court has done on at 
least one occasion. In Union Electric Co. v. EPA,145 the Court addressed the 
question of whether an operator of an electric company could raise the claim 
that it was infeasible to comply with a state implementation plan under the 
Clean Air Act.146 The Court relied on the fact that both House and Senate 
bills contained language expressly providing that the states could submit 
plans that were stricter than the national standards.147 The Conference 
Committee had deleted this language. But rather than taking that deletion to 
mean that the conferees intended to prohibit the states’ submission of stricter 
plans, the Court invoked the Senate and House rules to conclude that the 
deleted language was just superfluous. Since the conferees had no authority 
to change the agreed upon language, the remainder of the bill must have 
already reached the result of the deleted language.148 Troublingly, the Court’s 
reasoning overlooked the possibility that lawmakers chose not to follow the 
rules and instead decided to change course as a policy matter.  
Nourse invokes Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice,149 which 
addressed whether the American Bar Association (ABA) had to comply with 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), which required that 
governmental entities “established or utilized” by the President meet certain 
procedural requirements.150 The majority concluded that the ABA did not 
have to do so, arguing that if “utilize” took on its ordinary meaning of “use,” 
almost everyone who met with the President would be subject to the FACA 
 
142. FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS 
AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. NO. 101–28, at 484 (Alan S. Frumin ed., 1992). 
143. Id. at 463. 
144. RYBICKI, supra note 125, at 17. 
145. 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
146. Id. at 249. 
147. Id at 262. 
148. See id. at 262–63 (reasoning that the Conference Report’s silence “offers no suggestion 
that the Conference bill” intended to prohibit stricter plans). 
149. 491 U.S. 440 (1989). 
150. Nourse, supra note 1, at 92–97; see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 
440, 443 (1989) (questioning whether FACA applies to the ABA’s advice regarding potential 
nominees for federal judgeships). 
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requirements, leading to absurd results.151 Instead, the majority, in a 
somewhat tortured fashion, interpreted “utilized” to mean “established.”152 
Nourse carefully examines legislative history to show that, in light of 
congressional rules, “utilize” indeed is best read in the technical sense to 
mean “established.” In Public Citizen, the Senate bill covered entities 
“established or organized” by the President and the House bill used the term 
“established.”153 According to Nourse, since “[c]onference committees 
cannot—repeat, cannot—change the text of a bill where both houses have 
agreed to the same language,” the term that was inserted at conference—
“utilize”—should be read to conform to the language in the underlying 
bills.154 In this case, utilize should be read to mean “established.” Reliance 
on the rules, according to Nourse, reaches the same result as the Public 
Citizen majority, but in a straightforward manner that avoids the 
controversial absurd-results canon.155 
But is it so simple? Although both bills used the same “established” 
verbiage, the bills contained other differences in their definitions of advisory 
committees. The House definition of “advisory committees” applied to 
entities that were:  
established or organized under a statute, an Executive order, or by 
other means, to advise and make recommendations to an officer or 
agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government or to the 
Congress, or both, but such term excludes standing or special 
committees of the Congress, any local civic group whose primary 
function is that of rendering a public service in relation to a Federal 
program, as well as any State or local committee, council, board, 
commission, or similar group established to advise or make 
recommendations to State or local officials or agencies.156 
The Senate definition, in contrast, created two separate subcategories of 
“advisory committees,” first defining “agency advisory committees” as 
entities that were: 
established or organized under any statute or by the President or any 
officer of the Government for the purpose of furnishing advice, 
recommendations, or information to any officer or agency, or to any 
such officer or agency and to the Congress, and which is not composed 
wholly of officers or employees of the Government.157 
 
151. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 452–53. 
152. Id. at 462–63. 
153. Id. at 459, 461. 
154. Nourse, supra note 1, at 94–95. 
155. Id. at 96–97. 
156. Federal Advisory Committee Standards Act, H.R. 4383, 92d Cong.§ 3(2) (as introduced in 
House, Feb. 17, 1971). 
157. Federal Advisory Committee Act, S. 3529, 92d Cong. § 3(1) (1972). 
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The Senate definition also applied to “presidential advisory 
committees” that were “established or organized under any statute or by the 
President for the purpose of furnishing advice, recommendations, or 
information to the President or the Vice President, or to the President or the 
Vice President and the Congress, and which is not composed wholly of 
officers or employees of the Government.”158 
There are several things to note here. For one, although the Senate and 
House bills contained the same “established” language, the definitions more 
generally were divergent. Under the conference rules, the houses cannot 
consider new matters or matters on which they agree. Since the definitions 
themselves differed, they would have been up for grabs in the conference. 
This is because the relevant rules do not apply to words or phrases, but to 
“matters.”159 Generally, this rule is applied on a provision-by-provision 
basis.160  
Furthermore, as the Public Citizen Court noted, the Senate bill was an 
amendment by substitute that struck out the entire text of the House bill.161 
As a substitute version, it would have conferred on the conferees “wider 
latitude or wider scope for compromise in dealing with the matters in 
dispute,”162 than in the case of amendments to various sections. The conferees 
would have had discretion to make modifications so long as these were 
germane to the underlying bills.163 Although the conference report cannot 
introduce new matter, germaneness has been liberally interpreted in the case 
of substitute bills.164 
But even if the definition of “advisory committees” was not in dispute, 
can we be confident that the legislative rules sufficiently cabined Congress 
such that the enacted “utilized” language had to have been construed as the 
agreed upon “established” language? Certainly not if the houses had waived 
the rules, as is often the case in the House at least.165 And in the Senate, 
precedents have bestowed “considerable latitude” on conferees.166 Intuiting 
where precisely such latitude ends would be difficult for a court to do. To 
 
158. Id. 
159. See ELIZABETH RYBICKI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22733, SENATE RULES 
RESTRICTING THE CONTENT OF CONFERENCE REPORTS 1  (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
RS22733.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYU9-UYZZ] (describing the Senate’s practice of allowing 
inclusion of new matter so long as it is “reasonably related to the matter sent to conference”). 
160. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XXVIII, at 40 (2013) 
(allowing senators to raise points of order against “provisions” of a conference report). 
161. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 461–62 (1989). 




165. RYBICKI, supra note 125, at 1. 
166. Id. 
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complicate matters further, even if there is no evidence of waiver, senators 
and representatives may simply have chosen not to raise a scope point of 
order.  
One could make an argument that courts must assume that members of 
Congress are “faithful agents” who follow the rules.167 Even where the rules 
are evaded, for instance by inserting material at conference that was out of 
scope, a member voting on the material would assume the rules are followed 
and that the addition was immaterial. Thus, the general force of the rules still 
stands.168  
It is unclear that members would necessarily assume the rules were 
being followed. Given the endogenous and politicized nature of legislative 
rules, an agent may fully grasp the reality that the rules are often broken, 
sometimes egregiously so, while still being “faithful” to the congressional 
enterprise. In other words, faithful adherence to the congressional enterprise 
does not require faithful adherence to the rules since the rules are meant to 
flexibly accommodate the political desires of the members. 
Thus, a lawmaker who sees that “utilize” has been added to the 
conference report in Public Citizen may have simply assumed that conferees 
had taken latitude with the rules rather than that its meaning had not changed. 
She may have decided that a point of order was unwarranted given her 
agreement with the bill’s substance. Pretending that a member assumes rule 
compliance thereby erodes the self-executing nature of the rules, which 
presents separation of powers concerns as discussed below.169 
B.  The Budget Process 
In addition to general legislative rules, the budget process prescribes 
intricate procedures for the houses through both statutory and internal rules. 
The basic scaffolding for the budget process is the Congressional Budget Act 
of 1974, which prescribes the development of Congress’s budget plan 
through the budget resolution.170 The overarching goal of the process is to 
determine how much money Congress can spend each year, its spending 
priorities, and how those priorities can be funded.171 The budget process has 
become of increasing importance due to (1) the reconciliation process, which 
circumvents the filibuster, and (2) PAYGO rules, which require deficit 
neutrality of new legislation. The following Section discusses possible 
 
167. Nourse, supra note 1, at 95 n.100. 
168. Id. at 92 n.86. 
169. See infra notes 262–93 and accompanying text. 
170. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 
297 (1974). 
171. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: INTRODUCTION TO THE 
FEDERAL BUDGET PROCESS (2019), https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-
the-federal-budget-process [https://perma.cc/327L-FFF3]. 
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methods by which courts could look to the budget process in statutory 
interpretation.  
1. The Rules of Reconciliation 
 
One challenge posed to interpreters is the increasingly nontraditional 
manner in which Congress legislates. Rather than following the classic path 
outlined in the Schoolhouse Rock cartoon, Congress deploys what Barbara 
Sinclair has labeled “unorthodox lawmaking.”172 A notable example of this 
is the reconciliation process.173 Reconciliation allows for legislation to pass 
without threat of filibuster and with limited debate and amendments. 
Majorities have used this powerful tool to pass major pieces of legislation, 
like the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) and the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 
The rushed process sometimes results in less-than-perfect legislation, to put 
it charitably. 
As other scholars have noted, King v. Burwell174 illustrates the Court’s 
possible turn toward recognition of unorthodox lawmaking in its interpretive 
presumptions.175 The Court considered the question of whether a sloppily 
drafted tax provision providing for health insurance subsidies purchased 
through the “Exchange[s] established by the State” included insurance 
through state and federal exchanges or just the former.176 The IRS had 
interpreted the Act as providing for tax subsidies not only in relation to state-
run exchanges but federal ones as well. At stake was the health insurance of 
some 6.4 million Americans who purchased insurance through the federal 
exchanges and who received a subsidy.177 
The Court ultimately construed the phrase at issue liberally to 
encompass federal exchanges. In so doing, the Court recognized the 
streamlined process by which the Act was enacted, reasoning that 
 
172. BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE 
U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2017). 
173. See, e.g., Rebecca Kysar, Tax Law and the Eroding Budget Process, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 61, 61 (2018) [hereinafter Kysar, Taxes] (describing the reconciliation process in the context 
of tax reform); Rebecca Kysar, Reconciling Congress to Tax Reform, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
2121, 2123 (2013) [hereinafter Kysar, Reconciling Congress] (same). 
174. 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
175. See, e.g., Gluck et al., supra note 35, at 1794 (positing that King reflected the new reality 
that “unorthodoxies are everywhere” in the legislative process). 
176. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487. 
177. Lena H. Sun, 6.4 Million Americans Could Lose Obamacare Subsidies, Federal Data 
Showed, WASH. POST (June 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/64-
million-americans-could-lose-obamacare-subsidies-federal-data-show/2015/06/02/fe0c87be-095a-
11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html [https://perma.cc/CX4Q-4MLX]. 
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reconciliation took away “care and deliberation that one might expect of such 
significant legislation” resulting in “inartful drafting.”178  
This case reflects an important willingness by the Court to adapt its 
interpretive rules based on congressional process. The Court could have 
easily embraced a purposive approach in interpreting the Affordable Care 
Act, reasoning that limiting insurance subsidies to state-run exchanges was 
perhaps within the letter of the statute but not its spirit.179 It would have done 
so, however, by flouting the text of the statute. By instead grounding its 
reasoning in process, the Court privileges the text, albeit through 
unconventional interpretations of it.180 
Courts may run into trouble, however, if they try to apply the rules of 
the reconciliation process on a more granular level. After senators began 
adding unrelated amendments to reconciliation bills in the 1980s, concern 
arose over how the process was being abused. West Virginia Senator Robert 
Byrd secured a safeguard, called the “Byrd Rule,” that prevents the Senate 
from considering a reconciliation bill with certain forbidden provisions.181 
Originally codified in 1985, the Byrd Rule has since been expanded and 
revised.182 The Byrd Rule now allows a Senator to raise a point of order if 
reconciliation legislation includes a provision that is “extraneous.” A 
provision is “extraneous” if it: 
(A) does not produce a change in outlays or revenues; 
(B) produces an increase in outlays or decrease in revenues that 
does not follow the reconciliation instructions in the budget 
resolution;  
(C) is not in the jurisdiction of the committee that reported the 
provision;  
(D) produces changes in outlays or revenues that are merely 
incidental to the nonbudgetary components of the provision;  
(E) increases the deficit in any fiscal year after the period specified 
in the budget resolution (i.e., the “budget window”); or  
(F) recommends changes to Social Security.183 
 
178. King, 135 S. Ct  at 2492 (citations omitted). 
179. Barrett, supra note 2, at 2199. 
180. Id. 
181. ROBERT KEITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS:  
THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 1 (2009), https://budgetcounsel.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/crs- 
the-budget-reconciliation-process-the-senate_s-e2809cbyrd-rulee2809d-bob-keith-rl30862-july-8-
2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6XR-BLF4]. 
182. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 20001, 
100 Stat. 82, 390–91 (1986); Kysar, Reconciling Congress, supra note 173, at 2131–32. 
183. See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1) (2018) (providing these requirements). 
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Like other legislative rules, the Byrd Rule is not self-executing.184 A 
senator has to first challenge a provision on the grounds that it is extraneous. 
The Presiding Officer of the Senate then decides whether to sustain or 
overrule the point of order.185 If sustained, unless sixty senators vote to waive 
the Byrd Rule or override the Presiding Officer, the offending provision must 
be excised from the bill.186 Sixty senators can also overcome the Presiding 
Officer’s rejection of a point of order.187  
In order to determine whether or not a provision is extraneous, the 
Presiding Officer consults with the Senate Budget Committee Chair or the 
Senate Parliamentarian.188 The Senate Budget Committee Chair consults on 
challenges under subparagraphs (B) and (E) of the Byrd Rule and the 
Parliamentarian on the rest.189 The Senate Budget Committee Chair uses Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) and CBO estimates in making decisions under 
(B) and (E).190 Thus, their estimates are crucial to passing these types of Byrd 
Rule challenges. 
In Association of Accredited Cosmetology Schools v. Alexander,191 a 
D.C. district court construed a statute that was passed through the 
reconciliation process so that it complied with subsection (A) of the Byrd 
Rule.192 The D.C. district court was considering the meaning of a statute that 
affected the plaintiff school’s eligibility to participate in federal student aid 
programs. The statute excluded institutions with a “cohort default rate” equal 
or greater to a threshold percentage, which was 35% for 1991 and 1992 and 
30% for any subsequent year.193 The plaintiffs argued that the threshold 
percentages should be determined in the year the defaults occurred, while the 
government argued that they applied to the year in which the determinations 
of ineligibility were made.194 
The court sided with the government, in part, because its interpretation 
was “most compatible with the underlying congressional purpose.”195 The 
court rejected the plaintiff’s reading of the statute because it would have 
 
184. Ellen P. Aprill & Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View, 81 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 105 (2018). 
185. 2 U.S.C. § 644(e) (2018). 
186. KEITH, supra note 181, at 4. 
187. Id. 
188. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 105. 
189. Id. at 106. 
190. Id. at 105. 
191. 774 F. Supp. 655 (D.D.C. 1991). 
192. Id. at 659. 
193. Id. at 658. 
194. Id. at 658–59. 
195. Id. at 659. 
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meant that the bill did not impact the budget in 1991. This would have 
subjected the bill to a point of order under the Byrd Rule.196 
The flaw in the district court’s reasoning is that senators often do not 
raise points of order during reconciliation.197 Moreover, the 
Parliamentarian’s rulings in this area are often nontransparent, inconsistent, 
and often reflect a judgment call that is not easily replicated by a court.198 
The ability of a judge to even discern Byrd Rule violations in the first place 
is questionable. 
Consider a precedent from the 107th Congress. Senate Parliamentarian 
Robert Dove ruled that a measure setting aside $5 billion for natural disasters 
did not comply with the Byrd Rule since there would be no impact on 
revenues or outlays in the case of no natural disasters.199 The ruling was 
heavily publicized because it prompted Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott to 
fire Dove.200 Most of the time, however, the Parliamentarian’s rulings on the 
subject are not public. Instead, the Parliamentarian rules on Byrd Rule 
violations behind closed doors.201 Only when senators or staffers disclose 
what transpired are we privy to how the Parliamentarian ruled and on what 
grounds.202 
If a court were to try to apply the Byrd Rule on its own, it would thus be 
able to draw upon only a very narrow slice of the Parliamentarian’s rulings, 
which can prove challenging since the Byrd Rule is not always easy to apply. 
Take, for instance, the above example. Yes, it is true that, if there are no 
natural disasters, the $5 billion set-aside would not have impacted revenues 
or outlays. But from a risk-adjusted perspective, surely there would have 
been the expectation that the set-aside would have been drawn down 
 
196. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-881, at 61 (1990)). 
197. See, e.g., George K. Yin, How the Byrd Rule Might Have Killed the 2017 Tax Bill . . . and 
Why It Didn’t, A.B.A. TAX TIMES, Aug. 2018, at 16, 20, https://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/taxation/publications/abataxtimes_home/18aug/18aug-pp-yin-how-the-byrd-rule-might-
have-killed-the-2017-tax-bill/ [https://perma.cc/RH88-4V9U] (“If the reconciliation process is now 
to be used principally to enable thin majorities in Congress to pass important legislative 
priorities . . . it is not likely that a senior member of such a majority . . . will thwart that goal by 
requiring strict compliance with the Byrd rule.”). 
198. See Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 107–08 (detailing the lack of transparency in 
rulings by the Senate Parliamentarian). 
199. See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 148–49 (3d ed. 
2007) (explaining Senate Parliamentarian Dove’s pivotal role in reconciliation disputes during the 
Bush Administration); David E. Rosenbaum, Rules Keeper Is Dismissed by Senate, Official Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/08/us/rules-keeper-is-dismissed-by-
senate-official-says.html [https://perma.cc/AJ8F-URV4] (noting the $5 billion disaster-relief 
provision at issue). 
200. Rosenbaum, supra note 199. 
201. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 107. 
202. Id. at 134. 
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somewhat. The ruling therefore reflected the idiosyncratic judgement of 
Robert Dove.  
A similar issue arose in the context of the TCJA. Senator Bob Corker of 
Tennessee had predicated his support for the bill on the addition of a “trigger” 
mechanism that would have reversed some of the bill’s tax cuts if revenues 
fell below projections at a future date.203 Reportedly, the Parliamentarian 
ruled that the provision violated the Byrd rule.204 The rationale of the 
Parliamentarian is unknown, but the most likely explanation is that the trigger 
did not “produce a change in outlays or revenues.”205 This is again a bit odd. 
The JCT listed the trigger as having a “negligible” effect on revenues, 
although it is unclear whether this means there were no costs or whether JCT 
was instead following CBO policy of not estimating budget costs or savings 
from measures targeting overall spending and revenues.206  
Taking into account the expected value of the trigger, meaning both 
upside and downside risks, however, would have clearly cost the government 
revenues. A reasonable person could have decided the question very 
differently. Moreover, triggers have made their way into prior reconciliation 
bills. Expecting a judge to make such calls on how the Byrd Rule would have 
been interpreted by a Parliamentarian is problematic given the 
nontransparency of such prior rulings.  
Muddying the picture further, the precedence of former rulings may not 
be given much weight. Even where the Parliamentarian’s rulings are 
available, they often conflict. Under subparagraph (D) of the Byrd Rule, the 
provisions cannot produce changes in outlays or revenues that are “merely 
incidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision.”207 During 
consideration of the TCJA, the Parliamentarian aggressively applied this 
provision to remove several provisions from the bill, including: 
A provision that would have required foreign airlines to pay corporate 
tax on some of their profits, producing $200 million in revenues; 
A provision that would have allowed taxpayers to set up college 
savings plans for children who were not yet born but in utero, costing 
$100 million in revenues; 
 
203. Ryan McCrimmon & Joe Williams, GOP Searching for New Tax Tweak After Senate 
Parliamentarian Guidance, ROLL CALL (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/ 
tax-increase-trigger-would-violate-rules-perdue-says [https://perma.cc/4G2H-RVKM]. 
204. Id. 
205. See 2 U.S.C. § 644(b)(1)(A) (2018) (considering provisions in reconciliation bills 
“extraneous” if they do “not produce a change in outlays or revenues”). 
206. David Kamin, The Senate’s Revenue-Trigger Giveaway to Businesses, MEDIUM (Nov. 20, 
2017), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/the-senates-revenue-trigger-giveaway-to-
businesses-97b73a624ec1 [https://perma.cc/53G7-XEPA]. 
207. 2 U.S.C. § 644(B)(1)(D) (2018). 
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A provision that would have taken away the tax-exempt status of 
professional sports leagues, producing $100 million in revenues; 
A provision that spared certain private foundations from an excise tax 
on for-profit companies they own, aimed at benefitting Newman’s 
Own and costing less than $50 million in revenues.208 
The Parliamentarian even ruled against a TCJA provision that would 
have permitted charities to engage in political activities, costing $2.1 billion 
in revenues.209 Contrast these provisions with earlier precedents that allowed 
a vaccine price provision even though CBO could not determine its score or 
an imported tobacco provision that netted only $6 million in revenues over 
five years.210  
One could reconcile these decisions by making the determination that 
the TCJA provisions had a strong moral or policy component that 
overwhelmed any revenue coming in or out and the earlier provisions did not, 
but this is an inherently subjective determination that is impossible for a court 
to replicate. Further complicating matters, the Parliamentarian has recently 
started applying the Byrd Rule on a word-by-word and sentence-by-sentence 
basis, rather than the per-provision approach that was embraced by prior 
precedents and the statutory language of the Byrd Rule itself. This decision 
also produces unpredictable results.211 
Even within the TCJA context, however, the Parliamentarian’s rulings 
are difficult to reconcile. She allowed, for instance, a provision expanding oil 
drilling in Alaska that would have raised only $910 million. According to 
scientists, its negative impact on wildlife most likely dwarfed the revenues 
gained from the provision, and somehow it still made it into the final bill.212 
Stranger still was the Parliamentarian’s decision to axe the short name of the 
bill, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, allegedly because it had “no budgetary 
impact.”213 This departed radically from an earlier Parliamentarian’s view, 
who reasoned that the Byrd Rule “does not cover trifling matters.”214  
In short, interpreting legislation to comport with the Byrd Rule has 
obvious shortcomings. Many times, the Parliamentarian’s rationales are not 
available, and predicting how they would have turned out is difficult given 
the conflicting precedents that do exist. Additionally, the particular provision 
at issue could have garnered sufficient support on its substance such that it 
avoided points of order altogether, notwithstanding a technical violation. On 
 
208. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 121. 
209. Id. at 123–24. 
210. Id. at 122. 
211. Id. at 124. 
212. Id. at 125. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
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the other hand, the rules of reconciliation can tell the interpreter something 
about the legislative process that is helpful to the interpretation. The rules 
impart the information that Congress is operating with speed rather than 
deliberation. They need not be followed precisely in order to convey that to 
the interpreter.  
2. CBO/JCT Scores 
a. Black-Box Modeling.—Process-based theorists have recognized the 
rising importance of the budget process in lawmaking and have called upon 
courts to take this into account in the interpretive process. Professors Gluck 
and Bressman have advocated for the use of a CBO canon, which directs 
judges to interpret statutes so that they comport with the underlying 
assumptions of the official CBO estimates of the legislation in question.215 
Clint Wallace has extended this recommendation to the tax context, which 
utilizes estimates from the JCT.216  
Predating this scholarly work, courts have sporadically relied upon CBO 
estimates in interpreting statutes. For instance, in 1982, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia held that a statute applied retroactively 
because the CBO estimates assumed as much.217 In another case, the Seventh 
Circuit also decided a question of retroactivity utilizing CBO estimates.218 
Other courts have relied on other work product from CBO.219  
Some courts have declined to rely upon CBO estimates. In a 2005 case, 
the Seventh Circuit interpreted whether the term “governmental entity” in the 
 
215. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 780; see also Gluck, supra note 1, at 182 (defining 
the CBO canon by these terms). 
216. Clinton G. Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, 71 TAX L. REV. 179, 181–
82 (2017). Residing in the legislative branch, the CBO is a federal agency created by the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 that provides budget and economic information to Congress. 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, An Introduction to the Congressional Budget Office (May 2019), 
https://cbo.gov/system/files/2019-05/2019-IntroToCBO.pdf [https://perma.cc/FY4S-6NUT]. The 
JCT is a nonpartisan committee in Congress that has been providing expertise, including revenue 
estimates, on tax-related legislation since 1926. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, Overview, 
https://jct.gov/about-us/overview.html [https://perma.cc/KQ8T-33QU]. 
217. Nunes–Correia v. Haig, 543 F. Supp 812, 815–16 (D.D.C. 1982). 
218. Berman v. Schweiker, 713 F.2d 1290, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1983); see also ABKCO Music, 
Inc. v. LaVere, 217 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2000) (relying on CBO analysis that the bill in question 
had no fiscal impact in ruling that a phonorecord was not a copy for purposes of the Copyright Act); 
Gay v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that CBO estimates are “persuasive 
evidence” of congressional intent); Hendricks v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 1255, 1259 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(reasoning that the lack of CBO consideration to attorney fee costs indicates that the government 
was not required to pay attorney fees). 
219. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 374 (4th Cir. 2014) (relying on CBO report in interpreting 
the ACA); Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 206 (1985) (“[W]e hesitate to tell Congress that it might 
have achieved its budgetary objectives by less than the full range of changes it chose to utilize, 
particularly when the information provided Congress by its own Budget Office, on which it 
presumably relied, belies that conclusion.”). 
KYSAR.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2021  12:31 PM 
1148 Texas Law Review [Vol. 99:1115 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act required state, as well as federal, 
governments, to pay for information they sought from phone companies.220 
In so doing, they rejected a CBO opinion that the law would not impose new 
costs on states, reasoning that CBO’s view “on which Congress did not vote, 
and the President did not sign” could have been in error.221 That case was 
later cited by a district court in Ohio, which rejected a CBO report in 
construing the scope of the ACA since the “CBO does not and cannot 
authoritatively interpret federal statutes.”222 
The democratic concerns underlying the Seventh Circuit’s opinion 
should certainly give us pause, but if the scores are salient to Congress, which 
they undoubtedly are in many contexts, does this not at least somewhat 
alleviate the concern? Ultimately, if democratically elected members heavily 
rely upon CBO and JCT materials, then we should view those materials as 
incorporated into the democratic process. 
The CBO and JCT estimates are attractive for reasons similar to the rules 
of reconciliation, in that they can impart general information to the interpreter 
even when the budget rules that inspire them are not being precisely 
followed. That is, the estimates matter even when Congress takes liberty with 
the rules.  
Before we get to this, however, we must first answer a practical 
question. Are CBO estimates typically helpful to the interpreter? Many times, 
they are not. For instance, after a rushed legislative process, Congress enacted 
the TCJA, one of the largest overhauls to our tax system. The lack of 
deliberation contributed to the legislation being riddled with errors. One such 
example ended up being very costly to certain taxpayers. The omission of 
four words from the statute meant that retailers and restaurants could not take 
advantage of a provision that would have allowed them to immediately 
expense renovation costs, instead requiring them to depreciate the costs even 
more slowly than was granted under prior law.223  
To illustrate, assume that a Dunkin’ franchise owner invests $1000 in a 
new donut-making machine. Under old law, a business owner would have 
gotten a deduction of $844. As intended, the new tax law would have allowed 
the owner to deduct the full $1000. As written, however, the new law allows 
a deduction of only $421. Since any technical corrections bill seems like an 
 
220. Ameritech Corp. v. McCann, 403 F.3d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 2005). 
221. Id. at 913. 
222. Ohio v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 3d 621, 642 (S.D. Ohio 2016). 
223. Richard Rubin, Four Words Missing in the New Tax Law Give Restaurants Heartburn, 
WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-words-missing-in-the-new-tax-
law-give-restaurants-heartburn-1531215000 [https://perma.cc/A2UC-NTJQ]. 
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impossible feat in a sharply divided Congress, judges are left to resolve this 
conundrum—labeled as the “retail glitch”—in the interim.224 
What would the JCT score of the TCJA tell us about whether Dunkin’ 
can deduct the costs of the donut-making machine? Not much, it turns out. 
This is because the relevant line item in the revenue estimate, like most such 
line items, does not unpack the assumptions that the JCT made in the scoring 
process. Instead, the JCT revenue estimates simply enumerate the cost of the 
relevant expensing provisions as applied to all taxpayers, as can be seen in 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Expensing Provision Revenue Estimate in TCJA225 
 
 
From this, we can discern only that the expensing provision in question will 
cost $86 billion over the ten-year budget window. There is no public 
breakdown of what the provision costs on a sectorial basis, so we have no 
insight as to whether JCT assumed the provision encompasses retailers and 
restaurants.  
In many cases then, the CBO and JCT canons do little, if any, work. If, 
however, a judge wanted to try to understand JCT’s assumptions about the 
retail glitch, some contextual clues could assist in arriving there. For one, the 
conference report for the TCJA reflected that congressional intent was to give 
Dunkin’ and similar retailers and restaurants their deduction.226 A judge 
could assume that JCT relied on the conference report in scoring the bill. 
Second, in scoring a later proposed (but never passed) technical corrections 
bill that would have fixed the retail glitch, among other errors, JCT concluded 
the bill had no revenue effect.227 
This could be taken to mean that JCT originally assumed that the TCJA 
allowed expensing. All of this, of course, is circumstantial and does not 
illustrate with any certainty JCT’s assumptions. It also presents another 
 
224. Jad Chamseddine, Republicans Fail to Move Retail Glitch Fix on House Floor, TAX 
NOTES (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/legislation-and-lawmaking/ 
republicans-fail-move-retail-glitch-fix-house-floor/2019/11/25/2b51v [https://perma.cc/RM2L-
3PMH]. 
225. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE 
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE ‘TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT’ 1, 3 (2017), https://
www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/345B-T66Z]. 
226. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 365–66 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). 
227. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-1-19, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE HOUSE 
WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN’S DISCUSSION DRAFT OF THE “TAX TECHNICAL AND 
CLERICAL CORRECTIONS ACT” 17 (2019), https://www.jct.gov/publications/2019/jcx-1-19/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z835-PSD9]. 
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interpretive puzzle. Since JCT appears to follow “congressional intent,” even 
when faced with contradictory text of the bill, isn’t this problematic for a 
textualist? 
To be sure, there are instances where the revenue scores can assist the 
interpreter. Gluck and Bressman developed the CBO canon in the context of 
the aforementioned King v. Burwell challenge to the Affordable Care Act 
regarding when “Exchange[s] established by the State” included federal 
exchanges.228 Like the JCT’s scoring of the TCJA, it is not possible to tell 
from the face of CBO’s estimate its assumptions regarding how the agency 
construed this language. The estimate merely showed a line item that the 
subsidies amounted to $350 billion in outlays over the ten-year budget 
window period. 
 
Figure 2: Expensing Provision Revenue Estimate in ACA229  
 
Later statements by CBO staff, however, aligned with the view that the 
agency assumed the subsidies were available on both federal and state 
exchanges. In a 2012 letter to House Oversight Chair Darrell Issa (R-CA), 
the CBO Director confirmed that the agency did not consider the possibility 
that the subsidies would only be available on state-created exchanges.230 
Some courts used this letter in their interpretation of the scope of the ACA.231 
In the unique context of the ACA, the CBO made transparent its 
underlying assumptions. It did so in response to an official request by 
Representative Issa under Congress’s oversight authority. The majority of the 
time, however, the estimators do not make public their assumptions. In fact, 
outside of special requests from congressional members or committees, CBO 
and JCT rules prohibit staff from disclosing the inputs of their models.232 To 
the extent the assumptions underlying the scores are opaque, members of 
 
228. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text. 
229. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir. of the Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, at tbl.2 (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www 
.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/amendreconprop.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/DY4T-Y8JW]. 
230. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir. of the Cong. Budget Office, to Rep.  
Darrell E. Issa, Chairman of the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, at *1  
(Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/43752-
lettertochairmanissa.pdf [http://perma.cc/AX56-LX4J]. 
231. Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 426 (D.D.C. 2014); King v. Sebelius, 997 F. Supp. 2d 
415, 431 (E.D. Va. 2014); Halbig v. Sebelius, 27 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24 (D.D.C. 2014). 
232. Matt Jensen, Transparency for Congress’s Scorekeepers, NAT’L AFF. (Winter 2018), 
https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/transparency-for-congresss-scorekeepers [https:// 
perma.cc/2QEW-6EHF]. 
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Congress will be unable to ascertain what they are, let alone an interpreting 
court. 
The secrecy shrouding the work of CBO and JCT is intentional. The 
entities do not provide enough details for Congress or other independent 
experts to replicate or second-guess their analyses, thereby insulating the 
estimators from politics.233 The lack of transparency has even inspired 
legislation that would require the estimators to make their models and data 
available to legislators and the public.234   
One could imagine that if courts began deploying the CBO and JCT 
canons with frequency, congressional members, under the guise of their 
oversight authority, might then pressure their staff to release their underlying 
assumptions in hopes of swaying the judicial outcome. This would 
undermine the ability of the estimators to fend off political pressure, with the 
benefit of more openness and transparency in the revenue estimating process. 
These considerations must be carefully balanced. In 2018, however, CBO 
announced an initiative to increase transparency.235 These efforts may 
ultimately provide more useful material to the interpretive process. 
In some cases, the line items in the scores may be narrow enough to shed 
light on the interpretive question. Suppose, for instance, that a taxpayer 
argued that it was ambiguous whether TCJA repealed the deduction for 
personal exemptions. Consulting the official revenue estimates of the 
legislation, we can see that the JCT in fact scored such a repeal, and it was 
anticipated to add over a trillion dollars in revenue during the budget window 
period.236  
 





This would be fairly damning evidence that the JCT did not share the 
taxpayer’s interpretation of the provision in question.  
 
233. See Catherine Rampell, Academic Built Case for Mandate in Health Care Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/business/jonathan-gruber-health-
cares-mr-mandate.html (“The C.B.O.’s assessment of a bill’s efficacy and costs strongly influences 
political debate, but the office does not publicly reveal how it calculates those numbers.”). 
234. CBO Show Your Work Act, S. 1746, 115th Cong. (2017). 
235. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN UPDATE ON TRANSPARENCY AT CBO 1 (2018), 
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2018-08/54372-TransparencyUpdate.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7K36-VLM3]. 
236. JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-67-17, Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference 
Agreement for H.R. 1, The ‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,’ at 8 (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www 
.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/6R3D-HDCY]. 
237. Id. at 1. 
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Often, however, several elements of the law are often rolled into a single 
line item in the score. Also, even if the provision whose interpretation is in 
question warrants its own line item in the score, the precise interpretive 
question may not be binary such that the very existence of the score would 
tell the interpreter anything. For instance, if the taxpayer in our example is 
not arguing whether TCJA repealed the deduction but whether that repeal 
applied to her particular circumstances, the score will be of little use.  
b. Contextualizing the CBO/JCT Canons.—So far, the above discussion 
illustrates that, although the CBO/JCT canons hold promise as reflecting 
modern congressional reality, they may only help the interpreter in certain 
circumstances. When information underlying the scores is available to the 
interpreter, however, we must first ask a preliminary question: In what 
contexts do the scores matter? 
 i. The Reconciliation Process.—Motivating Gluck and Bressman’s 
embrace of a CBO canon is empirical evidence they gathered indicating that 
congressional staff heavily relies upon the all-important score. In Gluck and 
Bressman’s survey to congressional staffers, 15% of respondents identified 
the Congressional Budget Office as a significant influence.238 One staffer 
said, “[a]nything with a budget impact, we have to repeatedly go back to 
[CBO] to understand . . . their reading of the statute and then we have to go 
back and change it. This is extraordinarily widespread.”239 
No doubt that the CBO and JCT scores have risen in importance in 
recent decades, but the degree depends heavily on the circumstances. In the 
context of the ACA, news outlets accurately reported that “the bill’s fate 
hinged on the results” of CBO’s analysis.240 The reason, however, was not 
some immutable characteristic of the legislative process but one particular to 
reconciliation. At the time the health-care bill was being debated, the 
Democrats lost their sixtieth vote needed in the Senate and thus used the 
reconciliation process to enact parts of Obamacare.241  
The CBO and JCT scores dramatically shape reconciliation legislation 
because sections (B) and (E) of the Byrd Rule require them as inputs, as 
discussed above.242 The reconciliation instructions for the TCJA, for 
 
238. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 763. 
239. Id. at 764. 
240. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Senate Democrats See Hope on Health Bill,  
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/health/policy/10healthbill.html 
[https://perma.cc/H8U2-TU2J]; Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 764. 
241. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 
1029. Other parts of the healthcare reform plan are enacted under the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
242. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text. 
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instance, restricted impact on deficits to $1.5 trillion over the budget window 
period.243 Because its architects wished to bring the corporate tax rate down 
as low as possible while also giving individual tax cuts, even this high figure 
forced the creation of numerous provisions that helped offset the revenue 
losses. This was so that the legislation complied with subsection (B) of the 
Byrd Rule, which requires that the legislation stay within the parameters of 
the reconciliation instructions. More evidence of the Byrd Rule’s impact on 
the TCJA is that many of its key provisions expire at the end of 2025. This 
brought the legislation’s cost down to comport with (B) and also ensured that 
the legislation would not violate subsection (E) of the Byrd Rule, which 
prohibits bills from increasing the deficit beyond the budget window.  
From this discussion, we can conclude that reconciliation is the 
appropriate context in which to deploy the CBO/JCT canons. As mentioned 
above, fiscal conservatives demanded that the TCJA’s impact be capped at 
$1.5 trillion, and the reconciliation instructions as adopted in the budget 
resolution set forth this figure. Given the ambitious list of tax changes 
Republicans wished to accomplish, it proved rather limiting. It is possible 
that in a different political environment, a much greater cap would have 
alleviated any fiscal constraints and diluted the impact of the JCT score. Still, 
in a fiscal environment of climbing deficits, the reconciliation instructions 
will most likely have high salience among congressional members.  
There are tactics, however, that could arguably reduce the salience of 
the score.244 In the months leading up to the TCJA’s enactment, Republicans 
toyed with the idea of lengthening the budget window. A longer budget 
window would heavily test the CBO and JCT because forecaster variables 
across a much longer time period introduce significant uncertainty. This is 
because the longer the estimating period, the more sensitive are the forecasts 
to subtle changes in the assumptions underlying the scores, such as discount 
rates, economic growth, and macroeconomic factors.245 Costs inside the 
 
243. H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. §§ 2001–02 (2017) (budget resolution). 
244. The Budget Act of 1974 provides a floor of five years for the length of budget windows 
but does not provide a ceiling. Since the mid-1990s, the CBO has used a ten-year budget window. 
Rudolph G. Penner, Dealing with Uncertain Budget Forecasts, 22 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Spring 
2002, at 1, 12. Republicans, worried that sunsetting their complex tax reform after just ten years to 
comply with subsection (E) would cause greater planning distortions, floated a twenty- or even 
thirty-year budget window. Sahil Kapur, GOP Push for 20-Year Tax Cut Grows as Ryan Seeks 
Permanent Fix, BLOOMBERG (June 24, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-
24/gop-push-for-20-year-tax-cut-grows-as-ryan-seeks-permanent-fix [https://perma.cc/TH4P-
U86P]. This tactic would accommodate a much further off sunset date, potentially overcoming the 
downsides of temporary policies. 
245. George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal 
Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 209 (2009). 
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budget window would contain a large margin of error.246 Measuring costs 
outside the budget window for purposes of ensuring compliance with 
subsection (E) of the Byrd Rule would become even more attenuated. 
Although the scorekeepers are technically tasked by subsection (E) to look at 
all periods beyond the budget window, this is an aspirational goal, and 
scorekeepers cannot reliably estimate many years into the future. If the 
budget window period were lengthened by decades, the subsection (E) 
analysis would become relatively meaningless.  
A longer budget window would also decrease the importance of the 
official score along another dimension. Such a window would present 
opportunities for lawmakers to pretend to pay for costly policies by enacting 
tax increases or spending cuts that would not go into effect for many years, 
if ever.247 It is important to note, however, that this type of problem already 
exists under the current budget window. Congress has repeatedly delayed the 
effective date of the Cadillac Tax, for instance, which was designed to pay 
for part of the ACA through an excise tax on high-cost, employer-provided 
health plans. As part of the 2010 health care legislation, the tax was originally 
set to begin in 2018, although that has been delayed until 2022.248 The TCJA 
also deployed phase-in taxes on multinational corporations.249 The advantage 
of phasing in unpopular taxes is to meet the requirements of reconciliation 
while also signaling to taxpayers that lawmakers do not intend for them to 
take effect since a longer delay allows many chances for repeal or further 
delay.  
Lawmakers also possess another means to achieve technical compliance 
with the Byrd Rule, which exploits short budget windows. This type of 
budget gimmick involves pushing costs beyond the budget window and is 
nicely illustrated by the tax provisions involving IRAs. Traditional and Roth 
IRAs are similar savings vehicles that differ in how they are taxed. 
 
246. The CBO has estimated the 90% confidence range of its deficit forecasts to be plus or 
minus 5% of GDP after five years, but this number rises to 17% of GDP after twenty years. CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, THE UNCERTAINTY OF BUDGET PROJECTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF DATA AND 
METHODS 12 (Mar. 2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/78xx/doc7837/ 
03-05uncertain.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVJ6-F6XD]. 
247. For instance, a 1997 advisory council formed to tackle the insolvency of Social Security 
suggested a 1.6% increase in the payroll tax to fund the system, but only starting in 2045. SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., 1994-96 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT: FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
STATEMENTS, https://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/adcouncil/report/findings.htm [https://perma 
.cc/YLU5-EBGK]. A long budget window of 75 years allowed such a tax to count as an offset even 
though it was unlikely to ever take effect. 
248. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 9001 124 Stat. 865 
(2010); Suspension of Certain Health-Related Taxes, H.R. 195, 115th Cong. § 4002 (2018). 
249. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 250(a)(1) (2018). The deduction for taxes on global intangible low-taxed 
income is currently set at 50%. Id. For tax years beginning after 2025, the 50% deduction is reduced 
to 37.5%, and thus the effective rate on such income goes up to 13.125% in those years. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 250(a)(3) (2018). 
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Contributions to traditional IRAs are deductible but withdrawals are taxable. 
Contributions to Roth IRAs on the other hand are not deductible but 
withdrawals are tax-free. Assuming constant tax rates and interest, these 
vehicles produce identical revenue costs from a present value perspective. 
Traditional IRAs produce revenue losses at contribution, whereas revenue 
losses from Roth IRAs arrive in the year of withdrawal.  
Historically, lawmakers have gamed the differing tax treatments to push 
revenues to the budget window period. For instance, in 2006, Congress 
passed a law that expanded the ability of taxpayers to convert traditional 
IRAs to Roth IRAs. The conversion was taxable, thereby raising $6.4 billion 
in revenues during the budget window.250 In present value terms, the change 
in law actually cost the government $25 billion in revenues over a longer time 
horizon. Because they fell outside the budget window period, however, these 
costs largely escaped the budget process.  
That being said, it is difficult to conclude which way the budget games 
cut. On the one hand, the games potentially reduce the significance of the 
score since the score is only politically salient to lawmakers to the extent it 
hems in policy. On the other hand, their very existence seems to underscore 
the observation that the estimates are of the utmost important to 
lawmakers.251  
Although each of the potential levers has the potential to take pressure 
off the official score of the reconciliation bill in question, Congress’s 
 
250. Richard Rubin & Margaret Collins, Tax Break for IRA Conversion Lured 10% of 
Millionaires, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 3, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-
04/tax-break-for-ira-conversion-lured-10-of-millionaires [https://perma.cc/Z4K7-K784]. 
251. A host of other possible tactics exist to circumvent the Byrd Rule. Sunset provisions are 
one. Being able to enact a costly law, but using a sunset date to avoid violating the Byrd Rule, takes 
less pressure off of the official score. Another related tactic is the gaming of budget baselines. The 
official baseline is one of “current law,” meaning that it generally follows current law as written 
with some exceptions. See Omnibus Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 
257(a), 104 Stat. 1388–591 (1990) (using a baseline of “current-year levels”). For instance, the 
baseline assumes a sunsetted law will expire as scheduled. Recently, lawmakers, think tanks, and 
the official scorekeepers have experimented with alternative baselines, typically referred to as 
“current policy.” These baselines assume current policy will continue, therefore that sunsetted laws 
will not expire. This is because Congress has a tendency to renew sunsetted laws as a routine matter. 
Assuming they are used consistently, either baseline will ostensibly capture the full costs of the 
legislation. If a current law baseline is used throughout, the law’s costs beyond the sunset date will 
be captured upon renewal of the provision in question. If a current policy baseline is deployed, the 
budget process assumes the law continues to be in effect regardless of the sunset date, and all costs 
are captured upfront. A problem arises, however, if one toggles between the two types of baselines. 
If a temporary law is first scored using a current law baseline, then the budget process assumes there 
are no costs beyond the sunset date. If we then switch to a current policy baseline at the sunset date, 
the costs of reenactment escape the budget process because the baseline assumes the law continues. 
See David Kamin & Rebecca Kysar, Temporary Tax Laws and the Budget Baseline, 157 TAX NOTES 
125, 128 (2017) (“[U]nder a current law baseline, the tax cut is assumed to expire as scheduled and 
thus is scored as costing $100 billion. . . . [A] current policy baseline assumes . . . the expiring 
policy is permanent, [so] the extension is scored as costing nothing.”). 
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insatiable appetite for deficit spending means that, in spite of the 
gamesmanship, the rules likely still have bite.  
 ii. CBO/JCT Estimates Outside of Reconciliation.—Are there 
contexts outside of reconciliation for which the CBO and JCT scores matter? 
Without reconciliation, there is, of course, no Byrd Rule. Without the Byrd 
Rule, then it would seem the CBO score is not as significant. There are other 
budget rules we must consider, however. These “PAYGO” rules require 
offsets for revenue-decreasing legislation. If new legislation increases 
spending or enacts tax cuts, the associated costs must be offset with spending 
decreases or tax increases. 
PAYGO rules have been a significant part of the budget process since 
the 1990s. Their most recent incarnation is in the form of statutory PAYGO 
rules passed through the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010.252 The Act 
generally requires that the net budgetary effect of direct spending and 
revenue bills not increase the deficit, judged in both a five-year and a ten-
year period. The new PAYGO rules are aimed at discouraging net deficit 
increases. To that aim, the statute prescribes that the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) record the budgetary effects of legislation across five- 
and ten-year periods on a rolling basis. The chairpersons of the House and 
Senate Budget Committees are responsible for submitting the budgetary 
effects into the Congressional Record. These effects are based on estimates 
by CBO. If the Budget Committees do not submit the budgetary effects, then 
OMB determines them. After each congressional session, OMB finalizes the 
PAYGO scorecards and determines whether PAYGO has been violated, in 
which case the President orders a sequestration order.253  
CBO and JCT scores thus matter greatly, even outside of reconciliation. 
To be sure, when PAYGO was enacted, important exceptions were carved 
out from its reach. For instance, measures relating to the extension of the 
majority of the Bush tax cuts were assumed within the budget baseline, 
thereby effectively making PAYGO inapplicable to such measures.254 The 
Act also excludes any budgetary effects designated by Congress as for an 
“emergency.”255 Finally, Congress can expressly exclude legislation from the 
PAYGO scorecards when enacting subsequent legislation.  
Through these various means, Congress has excluded the budgetary 
effects of approximately thirty measures from PAYGO from the period 
 
252. Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, § 2, 124 Stat. 4 (2010). 
253. Id. § 5. 
254. Id. § 7. 
255. Id. § 4(g). 
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between 2010 and 2016.256 Some of these measures increased the deficit by 
trillions of dollars. In 2017, the $1.5 trillion TCJA was shielded from 
PAYGO through a piece of legislation passed subsequently to TCJA.257 In 
2018 alone, Congress excluded the PAYGO effects from the scorecards of 
three bills.258 In 2018, Congress also zeroed out the PAYGO balance 
altogether as of the date of enactment in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.259 
To summarize, outside of reconciliation, the score certainly matters 
unless PAYGO has been waived. If an interpreter wishes to use the scores 
and underlying assumptions in the interpretive process, then the weight given 
to them should vary depending on whether such waivers are in effect.  
c. Coda on the Filibuster.—In the spring of 2017, Senate Republicans 
deployed the so-called “nuclear option,” removing the filibuster obstacle to 
the confirmation of nominees to the Supreme Court.260 Given the radical shift 
away from the protection of minority rights, one wonders how long the 
legislative filibuster can hold on. If anything, reconciliation functions as a 
“release valve,” allowing a simple majority to determine major policy 
outcomes and thereby preserving the legislative filibuster for perhaps longer 
than it otherwise would last.261 Eventually, however, increasing gridlock and 
partisanship may make the legislative filibuster a relic of a bygone era of 
minority rights in the Senate. If this occurs, the role of the budget process 
will greatly diminish. In a world without the filibuster, the Byrd Rule and 
PAYGO would have no teeth since they are enforced only by the threat of 
minority protections. Any interpretation based on budget rules may thus have 
to be discarded if the filibuster falls.  
 
256. BILL HENIFF JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEMORANDUM: BUDGETARY EFFECTS 
EXCLUDED FROM THE STATUTORY PAY-AS-YOU-GO (STAT-PAYGO) SCORECARDS, 4–5 tbl.1 
(2017). 
257. Further Additional Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R.J. Res. 28, 116th Cong. § 104 
(2019). 
258. See VA MISSION Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-182, § 512, 132 Stat. 1393, 1481 (2018); 
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 1701, 132 Stat. 3186, 3532 (2018); 
SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 8231, 132 Stat. 3894, 4143 
(2018); see also David Ditch, PAYGO: A Bipartisan Failure in Need of Replacement, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/report/paygo-bipartisan-
failure-need-replacement [https://perma.cc/29Y5-6KWU] (identifying the exclusions in the 2018 
bills as a technique used to skirt the consequences of PAYGO). 
259. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 30102, 132 Stat. 64, 123; see also 
Ditch, supra note 258 (calling the zeroed-out scorecard the “most abusive” technique to avoid 
PAYGO responsibility). 
260. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for 
Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-
gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html [https://perma.cc/J32M-87RH]. 
261. Kysar, Taxes, supra note 173, at 63. 
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C.  Summary 
We can make a few general observations from our canvassing of general 
legislative and budget process rules. The most rudimentary insight is that 
legislative rules are not followed with precision and instead flexibly 
accommodate political preferences. It is surprisingly difficult to tell when the 
rules are being followed. The rules are not self-enforcing; a member of 
Congress must affirmatively make a point of order against a rule violation. 
But the absence of points of order against the bill may simply reflect political 
support of its substance rather than compliance with the rules.  
From this, we can conclude that, as a descriptive matter, construing a 
statute in a way that follows the rules may be an inaccurate depiction of 
congressional reality. I will flesh out more of what the interpreter can take 
from the rules below in Part IV, but we can glean some important insights 
from the discussion of budget rules.  
In the context of interpreting in accordance with the rules of 
reconciliation, we also encounter rules that are not followed. The picture is 
complicated further by the opacity of the Parliamentarian’s rulings in this 
area. Nonetheless, the discussion does show how the stratospheric rise in 
reconciliation’s importance may have some interpretive payoffs. Congress is 
legislating through this harried and truncated process in order to accomplish 
any policymaking at all in a highly partisan era. Perhaps, then, courts should 
be somewhat forgiving in their interpretation of its slipshod work product.  
The CBO and JCT canons show particular promise, with some caveats. 
They derive somewhat from an assumption that Congress is following its 
rules; the estimates would be much less important to lawmakers if the rules 
of reconciliation or PAYGO were immaterial. But we need not assume 
perfect compliance with those rules in order to see their power. This is 
because the general architecture of the budget process and the pressures on 
Congress to deliver legislative benefits through tax and spending guarantee 
that the estimates remain a focal point in the legislative process.  
Of course, there are caveats here too. Congress has several mechanisms 
through which it can significantly reduce the salience of the scores. If those 
mechanisms are present, then courts should take this into account in deciding 
how much weight to give to the scores. The biggest limitation for the CBO 
and JCT canons stems from the fact that the nontransparency of the 
estimators’ assumptions will present a challenge to an interpreter who wishes 
to use them.   
III.   Normative Considerations 
Leaving aside qualms as to whether the rules accurately capture 
congressional behavior, one could still argue that leveraging the rules in the 
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interpretive process allows the judiciary to indirectly enforce them.262 
Perhaps, then, this is beneficial. Although this indirect enforcement is 
presumably constitutionally permissible whereas direct enforcement is 
generally not, it still presents normative considerations. This Part III explores 
such arguments. 
A.  Undermining the Political Will of Congress 
First and foremost, nonenforcement of the rules may reflect strong 
political support for the bill on its substance. If the body overruled a chair’s 
ruling on a point of order, this may also reflect substantive support on the 
legislation’s merits rather than support for the procedural ruling.263 This may 
also be the case if no point of order is made. In this manner, the rules are 
inherently politicized.264 To assume they are being followed undermines the 
core of the lawmaking function—to formulate and implement policy 
judgments. Nourse contends that courts must assume lawmakers are faithful 
agents and therefore that they follow their own rules.265 In other words, only 
bad actors would flout the rules. But this is not the case. Congress itself 
intends the rules to accommodate political preferences rather than being 
ironclad. A good actor can thus violate the rules because the rules 
contemplate such violations.  
One could reason that encouraging Congress to follow its rules, 
however, improves the legislative process. Embracing rule-based 
interpretation thus harkens back to Hans Linde’s “due process of lawmaking” 
theory.266 Linde criticized rationality review of legislation for its 
inconsistency with congressional reality, since laws are the product of policy 
choices and compromises, appeasement of certain interests, and equitable 
considerations, rather than being tailored to a precise goal.267  
Linde instead proposed that the legislation be evaluated based on 
whether Congress observed due process of lawmaking, attempting to avoid 
the countermajoritarian difficulty. This due process of lawmaking means that 
“[the] government is not to take life, liberty, or property under color of laws 
that were not made according to a legitimate law-making process.”268 
Although Linde did not flesh out which procedures were forbidden and which 
 
262. Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1, at 521 (arguing this in the context of earmark 
disclosure rules); see also WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL 
LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1075 (5th ed. 2009) (describing circumstances in which 
courts might be able to enforce congressional rules indirectly through statutory interpretation). 
263. POPKIN, supra note 262, at 1075. 
264. Id. 
265. Nourse, supra note 1, at 95 n.100. 
266. Hans Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). 
267. Id. at 207–08. 
268. Id. at 239. 
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were mandated, he summarized that the “[d]ue process of lawmaking will 
include some but not all of the rules governing the particular lawmaking 
body.”269 Linde acknowledged that judges may be reluctant to strike down 
legislation based on process concerns.270 He nonetheless encouraged them to 
do so while also reiterating the value of fostering good process, regardless of 
the availability of judicial review.271 
Professors Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey identified three different 
iterations of process-oriented judicial review.272 One concerns whether the 
legislature is the right policymaking institution for the given question. 
Another focuses on whether the legislature followed rules of procedure. And 
a third, reflected in the federalism cases, focuses on whether Congress 
sufficiently deliberated a statute.273 Collectively, these strands encourage the 
legislature to compile findings, identify applicable legal standards, and enact 
law through legitimate procedures and deliberation.274  
Generally, courts have been reluctant to embrace due process of 
lawmaking, with a few exceptions.275 The most notable are the federalism 
cases, in which the Court required Congress to make certain findings before 
legislating in an area traditionally reserved to the states.276 Another example 
is Powell v. McCormack,277 in which the Court held that Congress could not 
expel a member when it did not follow certain procedures.278 In INS v. 
Chadha,279 the Court invalidated the legislative veto as in conflict with 
Article I, Section Seven.280 The Court struck down the line item veto for 
similar reasons in Clinton v. City of New York.281  
The judiciary, however, generally shies away from intruding too deeply 
into the legislative process. The Court has interpreted the Rulemaking Clause 
 
269. Id. at 245. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. 
272. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 118–31 (1991). 
273. Id. 
274. Id. at 1710. 
275. The Court has, for instance, held that the Due Process Clause does not apply to legislatures. 
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
276. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S 598, 612 (2000) (suggesting that when 
Congress legislates on matters traditionally reserved to the states, the Court may expect Congress 
to make particular findings about that legislation’s effects on interstate commerce); City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–31, 536 (1997) (same); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562–63 
(1995) (suggesting the same with respect to congressional overreach under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
277. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
278. Id. at 550. 
279. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
280. Id. at 958. 
281. 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998). 
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broadly, holding that the Clause preempts judicial review of the rules.282 
Other courts have continued this expansive view of the Clause, generally 
deferring to Congress except to the extent congressional procedure faces 
constitutional limitations283 or infringes upon fundamental rights of 
individuals (as when Congress is sitting in a semijudicial role).284 A stark 
example of this is Field v. Clark,285 in which the Court held that it could not 
second-guess the congressional practice that presumes the bill presented to 
the President is the one agreed to by Congress, even if the bills in question 
differed. The Field Court reasoned that Congress, and Congress alone, had 
the power to determine the details of the lawmaking process.286 
Professors Frickey and Steven Smith recognized that at least some 
strands of the deliberative model of Congress are in conflict with its decision-
making reality.287 Although their comments were aimed specifically at the 
third strand of due process of lawmaking, regarding whether Congress 
sufficiently deliberated, they are equally relevant to the theory as a whole. 
This is because the normative argument for holding Congress to its rules is 
presumably aimed at improving the deliberative process. 
Frickey and Smith draw upon the work of James Q. Wilson, who noted 
that the imposition of rational policymaking is in tension with democratic 
ideals. Specifically, that imposing rational policymaking on lawmakers 
reduces their ability to bargain, to engage interest groups, and to represent 
their constituents.288 Where the Court assumes a deliberative legislature is 
where it falters, according to Frickey and Smith. The Senate, House, and 
President must all vote on policies when, much of the time, the process 
involves developing majority coalitions through competitive, antideliberative 
tactics.289 The Constitution does not require that this process reflect reasoned 
deliberation. Going beyond the enforcement of explicit constitutional 
constraints on lawmaking, like the Origination Clause or the legislative veto, 
 
282. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). 
283. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 80, at 1022–23. 
284. Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 117–19 (1963) (reversing a petitioner’s conviction 
because a congressional committee did not follow its own rules in considering the petitioner’s 
request for a closed session); Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 88–89 (1949) (holding that 
a witness could not be convicted of perjury because the House Committee to which he gave 
testimony lacked a quorum according to the legislative rules); United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 
33 (1932) (interpreting Senate rules to bar the reconsideration of a nominee to the Federal Power 
Commission). 
285. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
286. Id. at 671; see also John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary 
Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1790 n.63 (2003) 
(describing the enrolled bill doctrine “as an analytical corollary to the Rulemaking Clause”). 
287. Frickey & Smith, supra note 93, at 1709. 
288. Id. at 1742. 
289. Id. at 1744. 
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also squarely puts the judiciary in conflict with separation of powers 
values.290 
Professor Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov has argued in favor of judicial review of 
the legislative process. Bar-Siman-Tov invokes H.L.A. Hart’s assertion that 
a given legal system must have mechanisms to determine the legal rules, or 
“rules of recognition.” According to Bar-Siman-Tov, because the judiciary 
can only apply those laws that meet the rules of recognition, the judiciary 
must have the means to determine their content, i.e., whether laws were 
validly enacted.291  
This argument assumes its conclusion, however, in that equally 
plausible is the possibility that the judiciary defers to Congress in 
determining whether laws are validly enacted before conducting its 
substantive review. Indeed, this is the American tradition since the Founding, 
which is contemplated by the Rulemaking Clause in the Constitution.292 In 
other words, judicial review derives ultimately from the people, and the 
people have chosen to reserve process to Congress. As discussed above, this 
has roots in separation of powers concerns that trace back to England. These 
concerns recognize that process cannot be separated from politics and 
policymaking. Without the ability to enforce, shape, and waive the rules 
governing lawmaking, Congress cannot effectuate its inherently political role 
as policymaker. Process is important for institutional legitimacy, but, as a 
constitutional and normative matter, it must ultimately give way to politics. 
One possible area that deserves special consideration are rules aimed at 
transparency in the lawmaking process. In prior work, I have previously 
argued for the judiciary to assume legislative rules are functioning correctly 
in the context of earmark disclosure rules, which attempt to disclose special 
interest spending and tax legislation.293 By refusing to recognize undisclosed 
special interest deals, I argued, Congress would be incentivized to follow the 
disclosure rules.  
The reason why this context is distinct from a separation of powers 
perspective is that even where Congress collectively wishes to follow the 
earmark rules, it cannot enforce them upon its members. After all, the goal 
of the rules is to unearth hidden special interest deals. It may, then, be 
appropriate for the judiciary to assist Congress in following its rules when 
 
290. Id. at 1750. 
291. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, The Puzzling Resistance to Judicial Review of the Legislative 
Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1915, 1946 (2011). 
292. See POPKIN, supra note 262, at 1074 (“There is no doubt that Congress can disregard its 
own procedural rules concerning how it adopts, statutes, assuming these rules are not 
constitutionally required. This is true even if the rules are contained in a prior statute, rather than in 
a House or Senate resolution.”). 
293. Kysar, Listening to Congress, supra note 1. 
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the rules are aimed at transparency. Otherwise, there is no mechanism to 
identify rule violations within Congress.  
B.  The Practical Need for Rule Flexibility 
Giving Congress the leeway to apply its rules flexibly also allows it to 
navigate between two competing goals in the legislative process: deliberation 
and efficiency. The rules themselves oscillate between these two poles. 
Giving Congress the liberty to relax the rules, at times, allows it to balance 
the two needs given the circumstances.  
Although thus far our discussion of enforcing the rules upon Congress 
suggests this would further deliberation, not all the rules further that end. 
Consider the most famous legislative rule of all—the rule that allows a 
supermajority in the Senate to invoke cloture, thereby cutting off the Senate 
tradition of unlimited debate.294 The minority right to filibuster has been 
further eroded by other developments, such as the elimination of the filibuster 
with respect to lower court and Supreme Court nominees.295  
Reconciliation and other fast-track processes, by definition, limit 
deliberation. Some of the legislative rules governing conference committees 
could also be characterized as curtailing deliberation. Once a bill comes out 
of conference, for instance, amendments cannot be made on the floor.296 
Debate on conference bills is often limited, even in the Senate.297  
Notably absent from the legislative rules are those long embraced by 
state legislatures to improve deliberation. For instance, many state 
constitutions require that all legislation be confined to a single subject.298 
Tracing back to ancient Rome,299 the purpose of this rule is to prevent 
logrolling, which allows otherwise unpopular provisions to be consolidated 
into one package in hopes of garnering a majority vote.300 The single-subject 
rule helps ensure that each provision gets full attention from legislators and 
citizens so that they are carefully considered.301 Other requirements missing 
from the rules that would improve deliberation are rules requiring all bills to 
be read or barring the introduction of legislation at certain points in time.302  
 
294. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XXII (2013). 
295. See Kysar, Taxes, supra note 173, at 68 (describing the elimination of the filibuster for 
court appointments as part of an incremental erosion of the filibuster’s power). 
296. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XVII, at 12 (2013). 
297. Id. 
298. Michael D. Gilbert, Legislative Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 803, 805 (2006). 
299. Id. at 811. 
300. Id. at 813–14. 
301. Id. at 816. 
302. Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
361, 365 (2004). 
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On the other hand, some of the rules are aimed at preserving the 
deliberative character of the legislature. The rules confining conferees to 
previously agreed upon matters could be said to function like a single-subject 
rule, allowing conferees ample opportunity to consider each provision. The 
rules forbidding legislating on appropriations are similar. By closing the 
universe of possible provisions, Congress can more fully deliberate on the 
ones that remain.  
The rules thus represent the reality that deliberation cannot be pursued 
at all costs. An overly robust deliberative process could damage the 
democracy since Congress would not be able to legislate effectively. The 
legislative rules, as written, attempt to navigate between these two goals. 
Ultimately, however, achieving the balance between deliberation and 
legislative efficiency is highly contextual. The ability of Congress to adapt 
the rules to accommodate political will allows it to navigate between debate 
and action in a given circumstance. Holding Congress to the rules, either 
directly through judicial enforcement or indirectly through statutory 
interpretation, would hinder this process. 
Still, perhaps the interpretive process could fulfill other goals of the 
rules by incorporating them. For instance, one aim of the budget process is 
to assist Congress in making coordinated decisions in an attempt to reign in 
deficits.303 One might posit, then, that indirect enforcement of the budget 
rules could help further fiscal discipline.  
In particular, the aim of the Byrd Rule is to protect Congress from its 
worst impulses by closing off the reconciliation process to deficit-increasing 
legislation. In practice, however, the Byrd Rule has failed to achieve its goal.  
As I have discussed in prior work, Congress can enact costly tax cuts 
through reconciliation by simply sunsetting them so that there are no deficit 
effects beyond the budget window. Because the tax cuts become politically 
entrenched once the public gets used to them, lawmakers tend to extend them 
without paying for them in the budget process.304 The existence of the sunset 
provision may allow lawmakers to hide behind the guise of fiscal 
responsibility when in actuality the sunsets are undoing fiscal discipline. The 
Byrd Rule sets up this dynamic.  
 
303. This aim may be responsive to public-choice theorists who posit that deficit spending 
occurs because politicians are inevitably pulled toward spending and away from taxing in order to 
appease their constituents. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN 
DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (1977), in 8 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JAMES M. BUCHANAN 144 (2000) (noting that “[t]he possibility of borrowing” allows politicians to 
“expand rates of spending without changing current levels of taxation” and that the resulting 
increase in future taxation “will not generate constituency pressures” comparable to an increase in 
present taxes). 
304. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 80, at 1034–35. 
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Further, although the Byrd Rule sets a ceiling such that the 
reconciliation bill cannot add more to the deficit than as prescribed in the 
budget resolution, this has effectively functioned as a ceiling and a floor, with 
Congress increasing the deficit in the amount of the cap.305 For instance, the 
FY 2018 budget resolution allowed Congress to add $1.5 trillion to the 
deficit, and the TCJA as enacted added over $1.4 trillion to the deficit.306  
The Byrd Rule may also, ironically, block fiscally responsible 
provisions. The trigger mechanism that Senator Corker proposed in the TCJA 
to reverse some of the tax cuts if certain revenue goals were not met did not 
make it into the bill because it violated the Byrd Rule, presumably because it 
would not change outlays or revenues.307 A more infamous case occurred in 
1997, when Senator Bill Frist (R-TN) proposed an amendment that would 
have required a sixty-vote threshold for legislation that increased the deficit 
and would have mandated the President’s submission of a balanced budget 
to Congress. A Byrd Rule point of order, which was one vote shy of being 
waived, struck the provision.308 This in turn paved the way for the costly Bush 
tax cuts.309 
More fundamentally, there is a danger in giving too much primacy to 
the budget process.310 The budget process, problematically, does not take into 
account nonfederal savings.311 Savings from preventing illnesses of the 
public do not factor into the cost of, say, providing a vaccine—only 
preventing illnesses in those who receive federal assistance in the form of 
Medicare and Medicaid count for budget purposes.312 Such conventions are 
there to ensure the budget is depicted accurately. There is tremendous danger, 
however, in relying on the scores too heavily in the legislative process since 
there are, of course, societal benefits to off-budget items.  
Policymaking is further distorted when budget considerations supplant 
other policy objectives. Scholars have voiced these concerns in the tax 
context, observing that tax legislation is increasingly shaped by budget 
 
305. Id. 
306. H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Cong. §§ 2001–02 (2017) (budget resolution); JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE 
AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” 8 (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.jct 
.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5053 [https://perma.cc/8H7P-4GSS]. 
307. McCrimmon & Williams, supra note 203. 
308. Aprill & Hemel, supra note 184, at 113. 
309. Id. at 114. 
310. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 765. 
311. Tim Westmoreland, Standard Errors: How Budget Rules Distort Lawmaking, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1555, 1592–93 (2006). 
312. Id. at 1592. 
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pressures.313 We are left with a tax code riddled with sunsets and provisions 
that are simply there to take advantage of timing games, like the 
aforementioned Roth IRA. 
Strict adherence to budget rules may also be entirely inappropriate in 
certain economic contexts. For instance, during the late 2000s, a reluctance 
to deficit-spend muted government responses to the financial crisis, likely 
prolonging the downturn. The ability to relax the budget rules to deliver 
stimulus is essential to the proper functioning of the economy.  
Finally, the budget process gives a tremendous amount of power to  
unelected staff of the estimating entities. Reinforcing this power through 
statutory interpretation arguably moves the lawmaking process further from 
democratic accountability.314  
C.  Summary 
To summarize, democracy demands nimbleness of legislative rules. 
Inherently politicized, the rules cannot be deployed with rigidity without 
threatening the lawmaking endeavor. Within Congress, procedure on the 
ground reflects this maxim. Judicial interpretation should as well.  
Practical concerns also dictate a relaxed approach to the rules. Strict 
enforcement of them prevents Congress from weighing deliberative goals 
against efficiency, and budgetary aims against other policies. Still, the rules 
may impart some valuable information to the interpreter, a topic to which I 
now turn in Part IV. 
IV.   Taking Procedure Seriously 
If a strictly applied rule-based approach to interpretation is problematic, 
then how should a process-based interpreter think about congressional 
procedure?  
One possible interpretive approach that follows from these insights is to 
distinguish those unwavering features of the legislative process from more 
ephemeral ones. Others’ contributions in this area are useful, ranging from 
how legislative history works in particular areas of law315 to how certain types 
 
313. Professor Michael Graetz concludes that budget pressures restrict lawmakers to “mak[e] 
the revenue numbers ‘come out right,’” crowding out traditional tax policy criteria, like simplicity, 
efficiency, and fairness. Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 
673 (1995). 
314. Gluck and Bressman recognize this danger but argue that it reflects a view that legal 
doctrine should “improve upon, not merely reflect, the legislative process,” a goal about which 
courts need to be explicit. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 783. 
315. See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory 
Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1231, 1235 (2009) (comparing the Supreme Court’s use of legislative history in its tax law and 
workplace law jurisprudence). 
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of legislation operate.316 Grounding an interpretive approach in fundamental 
features of the legislative process safely guards against unintentionally 
straying from reality.  
On the other hand, the insights of this Article could instead support a 
highly granular approach to process-based interpretation. If the context 
allows, an interpreter could dive deep into the process to see how it has borne 
out in the particular circumstances. As to which road the interpreter should 
take at this fork, of course, depends on the context. If an interpreter is assured 
in her ability to understand the ins and outs of the process, then a detailed 
approach may be justified. If instead the interpreter can glean only 
generalities with confidence, then an approach incorporating more high 
levels of abstraction is warranted.  
Importantly, congressional procedure can guide the interpreter in both 
of these endeavors, so long as it is contextualized. The architecture and thrust 
of the legislative rules, in turn, can often assist a court in developing a more 
nuanced understanding of congressional procedure. The remainder of this 
Part IV explores examples to illustrate. My general aim is to begin to lay the 
groundwork for refinements of the process-based school. My audience is 
those who take an interpretive view rooted in the judiciary as a faithful agent 
of the legislature. Thus far, I have detailed ways in which a process-based 
interpretation woodenly premised on proper functioning of the rules can 
undermine the interpreter’s role as faithful agent. I now explore ways in 
which taking procedure seriously, in all its pliancy, has the potential to 
strengthen this relationship.  
A.  Reconciliation 
Revisiting King v. Burwell can help illustrate the promise of using 
procedure in interpretation. Recall the issue was whether subsidies for health 
insurance purchased on “an Exchange established by the State” also included 
federal exchanges.317 The King Court reasoned that Congress used 
reconciliation to pass the ACA, which provided limited opportunities for 
debate and amendment. “[A]s a result, the Act does not reflect the type of 
care and deliberation that one might expect of such significant legislation.”318 
The Court then concluded that the statute was ambiguous, making this 
conclusion after considering “that the words of a statute must be read in their 
context.”319  
 
316. See Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 763–64 (discussing the impact of the CBO’s 
budget score on proposed legislation). 
317. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015). 
318. Id. at 2492. 
319. Id. 
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If the ACA had been enacted in the course of the regular legislative 
process, the King Court may have been less forgiving of the legislature in 
finding the statute unambiguous. Although this approach could shape the 
legislative process by forcing Congress to draft more accurately, it would 
impede Congress’s ability to privilege action over deliberation.  
Importantly, the King Court focused on reconciliation but did so in 
broad strokes. Identifying reconciliation as having a tendency to produce 
imperfect drafting is by no means an arcane feature of reconciliation. Rather, 
it flows from reconciliation’s fundamental feature—it’s a fast-track process 
intended to expedite legislation rather than nurture debate. In so doing, the 
King Court privileged legislative rules in its interpretation—specifically the 
rules that limit debate in this fashion—but examined their general thrust 
rather than their precise application. 
If instead the Court had focused on the minutiae of reconciliation, it 
might have run into trouble. Suppose, for instance, that giving tax credits for 
insurance bought on state exchanges did not have an impact on revenue 
because, in our hypothetical world, the states also were required to reimburse 
the federal government for the tax credits. A court could reason that the term 
“Exchange” must in fact cover those set up by the federal government, 
otherwise the relevant provision would have violated the Byrd Rule for not 
impacting revenues. 
Would this have been a fair application of the Byrd Rule? For one, it 
overlooks the possibility that members may not have objected to a Byrd Rule 
violation because they agreed with the provision’s policy. Even those 
members opposed to the provision may have been unwilling to object if they 
thought a supermajority would have easily overcome a point of order.  
Furthermore, it may also not be easy to ascertain whether in fact the 
provision had impacted revenues. Suppose for instance that a few states were 
insolvent and therefore unable to reimburse the federal government for tax 
credits. In that case, interpreting exchanges to only encompass states would 
have lost revenues, thereby meeting the Byrd Rule requirements even without 
the federal exchanges. Because the Parliamentarian rulings in this area are 
opaque, a court may lack relevant information in this regard. 
Another approach, and one taken by the lower courts, was to focus on 
the CBO estimate. As mentioned above, a congressional committee 
subpoenaed CBO to release its underlying assumptions, which indicated the 
subsidies were aimed at insurance purchased on both state and federal 
exchanges.  
With some caveats, the CBO score does not present the same concerns 
that a granular-level reading of the Byrd Rule does. A court’s reliance on the 
CBO score is premised on the efficacy of legislative rules but not their precise 
enforcement. Assuming the rules of reconciliation or PAYGO are in general 
effect, it is reasonable for a judge to assume that the CBO score influences 
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Congress. Notably, the rules need not be perfectly followed for that to be the 
case, which is why reliance on CBO assumptions is descriptively accurate.  
There are, of course, contexts in which the CBO score cannot help the 
interpreter. Most notably, the interpreter may not have access to the 
underlying assumptions made by the estimators. Additionally, if an act was 
outside reconciliation and Congress has waived PAYGO, the CBO or JCT 
scores have much less impact. In these contexts, then, it would be unwise to 
rely heavily upon the scores in the interpretation of the statute.  
To summarize, courts should not ignore the context in which legislation 
is enacted. A court’s knowledge of the general rules of reconciliation limiting 
debate allows it to understand how the process leads to poor drafting. 
Recreating how the more granular rules of reconciliation, such as the Byrd 
Rule, functioned in that process is much more problematic. 
B.  Appropriations 
Subpart II(A) examined whether congressional rules on appropriations 
could be used to guide interpretation and found Congress often disregards 
them. How might a contextualized process-based interpretative approach 
look? We can turn once again to TVA v. Hill, the snail darter case. As 
mentioned above, the Court invoked the legislative rules in the area that 
foreclosed legislating on appropriations, ruling that the appropriations for the 
dam could not be spent since the dam would have conflicted with the 
Endangered Species Act.320 
Congressional rules, however, can say one thing while Congress does 
another. Underlying the Court’s approach is a deeper misunderstanding of 
the legislative process. The Court, in enforcing a rule against implied repeals, 
rejected expressions by the appropriations committees that the dam would 
take precedence over the prior act.321 In so doing, the Court reasoned that 
appropriations were somehow lesser than “statutes enacted by Congress” in 
the deliberative process.322 In the Court’s view, the appropriations process 
was an insignificant part of the legislative process, with Congress as a whole 
ignoring the appropriations committees.323 
Interestingly, the Court misses the fact that Congress heavily focuses 
upon the appropriations process. It is, after all, where the money is. As a 
result, there are a vast number of interests that signal their demands to 
legislators, and the appropriations-committee members are among the most 
 
320. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.. 
321. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191–92 (1978). 
322. Id. at 191; Matthew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and 
Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon of Statutory Interpretation, 
14 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 669, 683–84 (2005). 
323. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 322, at 684. 
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powerful. The engaged and interested stakeholders ensure that Congress 
actively participates in the appropriations process.324 A contextualized, 
process-based approach to interpretation would take this into consideration 
in interpreting appropriations statutes. Far from hiding in obscurity, the 
appropriations bill at issue in TVA v. Hill, and the accompanying committee 
reports, was likely subject to much scrutiny in Congress. The Court, in 
adopting a stricter stance against repeals by implication in the context of 
appropriations, goes against the bigger realities of the legislative process, 
obscuring the forest for the trees.   
Building upon this contextualized view further, the TVA v. Hill Court 
rejected the legislative history preserving the dam project because it was in 
the legislative history rather than the text. This overlooked the congressional 
reality that appropriations bills generally contain directives in the legislative 
history since the financial blueprint resides in the text.325 In fact, the 
legislative rules prohibiting regulatory language in the appropriations text 
make legislative history exceptionally important in the appropriations 
context. In this context, then, a court’s knowledge of the rules can assist it in 
giving proper weight to legislative history.326 Regardless of whether 
Congress follows the rules forbidding legislating on appropriations with 
precision (and they do not, as we now know), these rules serve generally to 
elevate the importance of legislative history in the appropriations context.  
C.  Subject Specific Interpretation 
Another implication of developing a highly contextualized approach to 
process-based interpretation is recognition of the advantages that an “intra-
substantive” approach entails.327 Courts themselves have begun to develop 
interpretive principles that reflect the particular committees and processes of 
the subject matter at issue. James Brudney and Corey Ditslear have, for 
instance, compared the interpretive approaches of tax statutes and workplace 
 
324. Id. at 696–97. 
325. See Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 761 (characterizing legislative history as a 
“necessary repository of Congress’s directives with respect to how the money should be spent”). 
326. See CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 115-177, r. XXI(2)(a)(1), (c) at 871–72 (2019) (discussing 
unauthorized appropriations reported in general appropriation bills); STANDING RULES OF THE 
SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, r. XVI(2), at 11 (2013) (prohibiting amendments to appropriations 
bills from proposing “new or general legislation” or restricting expenditures based on limitations 
“not authorized by law”). 
327. Bressman & Gluck II, supra note 1, at 800; see Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and 
Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1033–58 (1998) (highlighting cases in 
which “background principles” were a “vital consideration” in the interpretation of administrative 
law statutes). 
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statutes, concluding that the Supreme Court often tailors their interpretation 
based on the realities of the committees and process at issue.328  
For instance, many members of the Court make heavy reliance upon 
legislative history in the tax context.329 This reflects the fact that committee 
reports in the tax context have been essential in elaborating complex, arcane, 
and highly technical tax statutes. The JCT is traditionally heavily involved in 
the process of drafting the committee reports, as are members of the Treasury 
Department and the tax committees. In the Senate, committee votes on tax 
policies occur on conceptual markups, rather than actual statutory text, 
making the legislative history even more important. For all of these reasons, 
members tend to rely heavily on committee reports on tax legislation.330 
A contextualized, process-based view would commend the Court’s 
attunement to the procedural differences across subject matter. That being 
said, some procedures reduce the differences between subject matters. For 
example, when tax legislation is passed through reconciliation, as was done 
with the TCJA, the legislative history becomes of reduced importance. In the 
TCJA context, contrary to past practice in major tax acts, the committee 
reports did not generally detail the policy reasons behind legislative changes. 
This reflects the rushed process in which it was passed. A court should adjust 
its interpretative stance accordingly, perhaps decreasing reliance on 
legislative history in the tax-reconciliation context or not reading too much 
into its absence. 
D.  Summary 
To summarize, knowledge of congressional procedure can guide the 
judiciary to a more nuanced understanding of Congress and the meaning of 
its statutes. This is a different project than strict interpretation of a statute in 
accordance with legislative rules, which has the danger of leading the 
interpreter astray from congressional reality. Nonetheless, familiarity with 
the rules can deepen awareness of congressional procedure, allowing the 
interpreter to take it seriously. 
Conclusion 
The process-based school of interpretation is poised to reinvigorate the 
field of statutory interpretation through the formulation of predictable rules 
with democratic bona fides. New interpretive presumptions, however, must 
strive to reflect congressional process without essentializing it. Congress’s 
procedural frameworks are a tempting shorthand, but they are only a 
guideline.  
 
328. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 315. 
329. Id. at 1283. 
330. Id. at 1281–82. 
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This Article began with a riddle: What is the significance of the rules to 
an interpreter when Congress routinely flouts them? Attempts to improve the 
process by indirectly enforcing the rules through statutory interpretation risks 
subverting Congress’s lawmaking. Such coercion also risks advancing rules 
in a manner that is corruptive to the legislative process rather than 
ameliorative. This is because such an approach necessarily ignores the 
inherent safety valves of the rules. The rules in the abstract do not guarantee 
a rational lawmaking process; instead, it is their application that allows 
Congress to weigh competing considerations that are essential to the 
legislative endeavor. 
Should, then, we abandon the procedural framework in interpretation? I 
have begun to explore the ways in which the rules can deepen our 
understanding of Congress, even when they are not being followed. At times, 
this leads the interpreter to glean only high-level glimpses into Congress’s 
inner workings. Other times, the interpreter may achieve a more granular 
reconstruction of the process through the rules.  
To be sure, rooting interpretation in congressional procedure presents 
formidable difficulties. In just a few years, however, undaunted scholars and 
judges have made important inroads to the project through careful study of 
Congress. Building a robust picture of the legislative arena is a collective 
enterprise that will continue to take the time and effort of many contributors. 
Perhaps most challenging, it will require the recognition of modest insights 
into the legislative process rather than simply extraordinary ones.  
